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RONALD K. L. COLLINS
AND DAVID M. SKOVER
CURIOUS CONCURRENCE: JUSTICE
BRANDEIS'S VOTE IN WHITNEY v
CALIFORNIA
From the tenor of the opinion. . . one would anticipate that
Justice Brandeis must end up in dissent. In fact, however, he
concurs in affirming the conviction of Miss Whitney. This
outcome leaves us with a train of puzzles as to what he has been
saying. (Harry Kalven, Jr.)'
On May 16, 1927, a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed Califor-
nia's conviction of Charlotte Anita Whitney for criminal syndical-
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ism.' The patrician social activist was known both for her family's
privileged status and for her allegiance to Leftist principles. She
was a member of California's Communist Labor Party, which led
to her arrest for organizing and participating in a group that ad-
vocated criminal syndicalism. After the Court's ruling, the fifty-
nine-year-old dissident faced up to fourteen years in prison. Only
a gubernatorial pardon would change her fate.
Justice Louis Brandeis-the great dissenter, advocate of civil lib-
erties, and champion of free speech-joined in that judgment.
Nonetheless, he penned a remarkable concurring opinion, now
hailed as "a brilliant exposition of the new philosophical defense of
political dissent."3 The opinion has been celebrated as one of the
most conceptually influential and rhetorically powerful justifications
for First Amendment liberties. That seminal concurrence has been
described as "arguably the most important essay ever written, on
or off the bench, on the meaning of the first amendment,"4 and as
"rankling] among the most frequently cited [opinions] ever written
by a Supreme Court Justice."'
Brandeis's memorable concurrence has been the focus of much
scholarly analysis. In 1988, Vincent Blasi authored a Talmud-like
line-by-line exegesis of most of Brandeis's words.6 Other commen-
tators, such as Bradley Bobertz,7 Ashutosh Bhagwat,8 David Rab-
ban,9 and Cass Sunstein,'l wrote of the significance of the Whitney
concurrence in the evolution of First Amendment theory and doc-
trine. Still others, like Thomas Emerson 1 and Rodney Smolla,"2
2 Whitney v California, 274 US 357 (1927).
Mark A. Graber, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil Libertarianism
100 (California, 1991).
4 Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion
in Whitney v. California, 29 Wm & Mary L Rev 653, 668 (1988).
s Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America's "First Freedom,"
1909-1931, 40 Wm & Mary L Rev 557, 645 (1999) (footnote omitted).
' See Blasi at 668-97 (cited in note 4).
7 See Bobertz at 641-47 (cited in note 5).
' See Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, The Story of Whitney v. California: The Power of Ideas, in
Michael C. Dorf, ed, Constitutional Law Stories 418-520 (Foundation, 2004).
9 See David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years 365-71 (Cambridge, 1997).
'0 See Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 26-28 (Free Press,
1993).
See Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 106 (Vintage, 1970).
2 See Rodney A. Smolla, Free Speech in an Open Society 105-06 (Knopf, 1992).
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depicted Brandeis's handiwork as a brilliant foreshadowing of a
more promising future for freedom of speech.
Neither these nor the many other commentaries on the Whitney
case, however, have devoted extensive attention to the following
question: Given Brandeis's faith in speech freedoms, why did he
concur in the judgment of the Court in Whitney v California? When
commentators have addressed that question at all, they have given
variations on the same simple answer: Brandeis (joined by Holmes)
concurred with the majority, "but only because the question of free-
dom of expression had not been raised sufficiently at trial to qualify
as an issue on appeal."' 3 Virtually everyone has accepted, with little
or no question, Justice Brandeis's assertion 4 that jurisdictional im-
pediments necessitated his vote in the case.' 5
But what if those commentators (and many others) were too
credulous? What if such jurisdictional impediments were more de-
liberately chosen than doctrinally compelled? Or what if there were
jurisdictional problems, but of a rather different order than Justice
Brandeis had suggested? What if Brandeis were wrong in the rea-
sons he tendered for voting to uphold Ms. Whitney's conviction?
Such queries raise yet larger questions: Is it possible that the Whitney
case was far more complex than Brandeis's concurrence suggested?
Much as we admire Louis Brandeis's eloquent and compelling
First Amendment jurisprudence in Whitney, we find his jurisdic-
tional and substantive arguments suspect. For that matter, we find
it difficult to believe that the learned Brandeis was entirely un-
mindful of the shortcomings of those arguments. Given such short-
comings, we consider Brandeis's opinion to be a most curious con-
currence. It is curious in its depiction of the facts and the law of
the case, and it is equally curious when considered alongside other
3 Juliet Dee, Whitney v. California, in Richard A. Parker, ed, Free Speech on Trial 38-39
(Alabama, 2004) (emphasis added).
14 274 US at 379-80 (Brandeis concurring).
"s See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 61 (Foundation, 1998); Martin Sha-
piro, Whitney v. California, in Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst, and DennisJ. Mahoney,
eds, The First Amendment: Selections from the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 135
(Macmillan, 1990); Philippa Strum, ed, Brandeis on Democracy 238 (Kansas, 1995) ("Bran-
deis wrote a concurrence rather than a dissent because Whitney's lawyers had not argued
that the statute was an unconstitutional limitation on speech that presented no clear and
present danger to the state, which were the grounds on which he would have overturned
the conviction. Brandeis felt constrained to follow the Court's rule that it would not decide
a case on the basis of an argument not made by the attorneys."); Kermit L. Hall, William
M. Wiecek, and Paul Finkelman, American Legal History: Cases and Materials 419 (Oxford,
1991).
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opinions penned by Justice Brandeis. For those reasons, we aim to
provide a more searching examination of Brandeis's vote in Whitney.
It is a largely overlooked fact: what Brandeis did in Whitney must
be viewed against the backdrop of what he did in Ruthenberg v
Michigan, a 1927 unpublished First Amendment case. In his Ruth-
enberg dissent, Brandeis first introduced the lofty free-speech prin-
ciples that later found their way into his Whitney concurrence. More
important for our purposes, however, is the irony that the far more
radical creed, conduct, and associations of Charles Ruthenberg won
Brandeis's First Amendment toleration, whereas the relatively be-
nign behavior and associations of Anita Whitney did not; and that
similar criminal syndicalism prosecutions resulted in different votes
by Brandeis. Why is this so?
The answer to that question is tied to the fact that the First
Amendment story of Anita Whitney is inextricably linked to that
of Charles Ruthenberg. And a fascinating story it is, both in law
and history. It involves, in various ways, an array of characters rang-
ing from a U.S. Supreme Court Justice (James McReynolds) to a
lawyer for the Hearst newspapers (John Francis Neylan) to two
civil liberties appellate lawyers (Walter Pollak and Walter Nelles)
to a Brandeis law clerk (Walter Landis) to an Alameda County
prosecutor (Earl Warren) and finally to a California governor
(Clement Calhoun Young). More significantly, this story establishes
that generations of lawyers and scholars remained oblivious to the
obvious, and let Brandeis's rhetoric divert them from what they
might otherwise have noted about his reasoning. Finally, this story
shows how, even as Brandeis sought to justify his concurrence on
procedural grounds, he ended by concluding that Ms. Whitney's
conviction had to be sustained on the merits.
I. THE FREE-SPEECH STORY OF CHARLES RUTHENBERG AND ANITA
WHITNEY
Charles Emil Ruthenberg and Charlotte Anita Whitney both
castigated the abuses of American capitalism and imperialism, and
demanded that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
association protect their right to do so. Both suffered the indignities
and penalties of social intolerance, police harassment, criminal pros-
ecution, and judicial sanction for advocating dissident beliefs and
associating with communist groups. And both asked the United
[2005
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States Supreme Court to safeguard their expressions of defiance,
and were rebuffed.
Their similarities notwithstanding, the differences between them
were stark and significant. Ruthenberg was a commoner from an
immigrant family; Whitney was upper-middle class and from a dis-
tinguished bloodline. Ruthenberg found his radical roots early on
in life-preaching on street corners, supporting labor strikes, or-
ganizing antiwar demonstrations, recruiting and training party
workers, and campaigning for office as a socialist candidate; Whit-
ney came to her dissident beliefs much later, after devoting years
of service as a social worker, probation officer, political lobbyist,
suffragette, civil rights activist, and civic league president. As na-
tional executive secretary of the Communist Party, Ruthenberg
gained a reputation as the "most arrested red in America,"' 6 re-
portedly with more than sixty indictments pending against him at
one time; Whitney was arrested only once, on charges of aiding
and abetting criminal syndicalism as a member of the Communist
Labor Party of California, and that after having delivered an address
to the Women's Civic Center of Oakland about the economic and
political disenfranchisement of African-Americans and the nation's
abhorrent practices of lynching. And, more central to our purposes,
Justice Brandeis raised a First Amendment lance in Ruthenberg's
defense against criminal syndicalism charges, but raised a shield for
the state when Whitney was similarly charged. The free-speech
story of Charles Ruthenberg and Anita Whitney is a study in con-
trasts, and an ironic tale of how a notorious dissident was lost to
legal history whereas a minor figure was catapulted into it.
A. THE YOUNGER YEARS
On July 7, 1867, Charlotte Anita Whitney was born in San
Francisco into an influential and refined family. She could count
five Mayflower pilgrims on her father's side; on her mother's side,
the Dutch Van Swearingen family, who settled in 1640 in Mary-
land, could claim two American Revolutionary officers, one a colo-
nel in the Virginia militia who produced a line of genteel slave
" This title was coined by the Chicago Daily Tribune in a report on Ruthenberg's arrest
in Chicago after a telegram informed the Illinois authorities that he had been indicted in
New York for violation of the state's criminal syndicalism act. See Most Arrested Red "in
America" Is Seized Again, Chicago Daily Tribune (Dec 2, 1919), p 5 ("It is said at present
he has more than sixty indictments pending against him.").
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owners. Anita's father, who suffered health conditions, escaped the
climate of New England by migrating to California in the 1860s
to begin a successful legal practice; there, he met his wife, and
raised his children in an environment of comfort and culture. In
the fall of 1885, George Whitney packed his daughter off to the
East Coast to be educated at Wellesley. She spent her holidays
with her aunt and uncle-in-marriage, the conservative Supreme
Court Justice Stephen J. Field. 7
Three years before Whitney entered college, Charles Ruth-
enberg was born in Cleveland, Ohio, in a small wooden-framed
house. His birth on July 9, 1882, added a ninth child to the im-
migrant family that had left Germany only four months earlier.
"Worker August Ruthenberg," as his father's name was recorded
on his marriage license, was a longshoreman who raised his family
in one of Cleveland's poorer districts. A socialist who believed in
organized labor, August never seriously engaged in radical politics
but exposed his son to Sunday afternoon discussions with his blue-
collar friends on the philosophy of Schopenhauer, Hegel, and
Schelling. Though Charles had wanted to go to high school and
college, his father's premature death of typhoid on August 23,
1898, forced him to earn money for the family. He became a
carpenter's assistant, working ten hours a day for $9.00 per week. 8
In 1892-1893, while Ruthenberg learned his fourth- and fifth-
grade lessons, Whitney engaged in social work at the College
Settlement on New York's lower east side, where she was first
exposed to real poverty. Anita had found "at last . . something
vital to be done."' 9 Returning to California in 1901, she began a
lengthy stint in charitable work. She served as secretary for the
Associated Charities of Alameda County from 1903 to 1910, and
spearheaded a successful campaign to oust racetrack betting. As
17 The essential facts in this paragraph are substantiated in the two most important
biographical works on Charlotte Anita Whitney. See Al Richmond, Native Daughter: The
Story of Anita Whitney 17-21 (Anita Whitney 75th Anniversary Committee, 1942); Lisa
Rubens, The Patrician Radical: Charlotte Anita Whitney, 65 Cal History 158, 160 (1986).
See also Clare Shipman, The Conviction of Anita Whitney, 110 The Nation 365 (1920).
"8 The essential facts in this paragraph derive from the major biographical work on
Charles Ruthenberg. See Oakley C. Johnson, The Day Is Coming: Life and Work of Charles
E. Ruthenberg 7-15 (International Publishers, 1957). Lesser works on Ruthenberg include
Elizabeth G. Flynn, Debs, Haywood, Ruthenberg (Workers Library, 1939), andJayLovestone,
Ruthenberg: Communist Fighter and Leader (Workers Library, 1927). See also Theodore
Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia: The Formative Period 13- 28,40-57,243-47
(Vintage, 1986).
'9 Quoted in Shipman at 160 (cited in note 17).
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the first probation officer of Alameda County, she established ef-
ficient methods that set the standards for her successors. She
helped orchestrate the 1911 victory for women's suffrage in Cal-
ifornia. As president of the California Civic League, she strove
for laws securing minimum wages for women and children, the
pasteurization of milk, the abatement of red-light prostitution dis-
tricts, and the right of women to serve on juries.2"
Not social work, but socialist work was the toil of Charles Ruth-
enberg in his early adulthood. At twenty-six years of age, he took
the pledge at a Socialist Party meeting in January of 1909. That
summer, he gave street-corner soapbox speeches on socialist prin-
ciples, including the need to secure rights for laborers, women,
and racial minorities. Somewhat self-conscious and halting as a
speaker, he nevertheless demonstrated the knowledge, earnestness,
and commitment that qualified him to head the Socialist ticket as
a mayoral candidate in 1911 and a gubernatorial candidate in 1912.
Ruthenberg used the power of his campaign to publicize the cor-
ruption of capitalist politics and to endorse the struggles of striking
workers. Although he lost both elections, Ohioans cast more so-
cialist votes in 1912 than any other state, and Ruthenberg's tally
for the governorship was only a little less than the 89,930 for
Eugene Debs's presidential candidacy. As organizer and secretary
of Local Cleveland, Ruthenberg focused in 1913 on the induction
of new party members and mass circulation of leaflets informing
the public of socialist platforms. Late in that year, he was arrested
for the first time at one of his street-corner speeches; though he
was released without charge, this event marked the beginning of
his ascent in the public consciousness-and police vigilance.2'
Perhaps nothing propelled that ascent more than Ruthenberg's
mobilization of public opinion in favor of worker strikes and in
opposition to "imperialist wars." In 1914 (the same year that Anita
Whitney joined the Socialist Party, after having witnessed the vi-
cious treatment of organizers for the International Workers of the
World), Ruthenberg initiated a statewide crusade on behalf of
Ohio coal miners. In the week that World War I broke out in
20 The facts on Anita Whitney's social and civic work are substantiated in Bhagwat at
409 (cited in note 8); Rubens at 160-61 (cited in note 17); Shipman at 365 (cited in note
17). See also Franklin Hichborn, The Case of Charlotte Anita Whitney 3 (unidentified pub-
lisher, 1920) (pamphlet on file with authors).
21 The essential facts in this paragraph were derived from Johnson at 21-25, 28, 39-41,
44-45, 70-71, 80-81, 86 (cited in note 18).
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Europe, he mounted a demonstration in Cleveland attended by
3,000 people who applauded his rebuke of war launched by cap-
italist profiteers. "Capitalism," he charged, "is fighting to replace
democracy in this country with a military machine. ' 22 And Ruth-
enberg was prepared to fight back for the minds and bodies of
Americans who might listen to his provocative rhetoric.23
B. THE WAR YEARS
"You Will Pay in Blood and Suffering" read the leaflet distrib-
uted by the Socialists of Cleveland on April 1, 1917. It was one
of many warnings delivered at a series of antiwar rallies organized
by Charles Ruthenberg to protest America's impending entry into
World War I. When Congress declared war on Germany five days
later, he composed a "Manifesto Against War," which the Socialist
News published. "In all history," Ruthenberg wrote, "there has
been no more unjustified war than that which this nation is about
to engage in. . . . No greater dishonor has been forced upon a
people than that which the capitalist class is forcing upon this
nation against its will. ' 24 The Manifesto urged workers to engage
in a general strike that would trammel the war economy and force
the government to remain neutral.25
Ruthenberg had long foreseen public counteroffensives to sup-
press socialist demonstrations against American war policy. "We
are being tested by fire," he notified the readers of the Socialist
News.26 Still, the heat had not yet been directed against him per-
sonally. That was to change in June of 1917. Under the pressure
of local businesses and newspapers, the Printz-Biederman Com-
pany forced Ruthenberg to choose between his political activities
or his purchasing-agent job; he chose socialism, and was fired.
Even worse, a Cleveland federal grand jury indicted him, along
with two of his colleagues, for obstructing the Conscription Act.
The prosecution's star witness was a young man unknown to him,
Alphons J. Schue, who had pled guilty for refusing to register after
22 Quoted in Johnson at 103-04 (cited in note 18).
23 The facts in this paragraph are found in Bhagwat at 409-11 (cited in note 8); Rubens
at 161-63 (cited in note 17); Johnson at 87-91 (cited in note 18).
24 Quoted in Johnson at 113 (cited in note 18).
25 The essential facts in this paragraph were derived from id at 109-16.
26 Quoted in id at 110.
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having been induced by Ruthenberg's speeches not to comply with
the law. With an unsympathetic jury, a guilty verdict was no sur-
prise. Before his sentencing, Ruthenberg addressed the court: "I
am not conscious of having committed any crime. The thing I am
conscious of is having endeavored to inspire higher ideals and
nobler lives. If to do that is a crime in the eyes of the Government,
I am proud to have committed that crime."" He was sentenced
to one year in the workhouse at Canton, Ohio.28
Out of jail on bail pending the appeal of his conviction, Ruth-
enberg mounted a vigorous mayoral campaign under the slogan:
"For Socialism, Peace and Democracy." His address to an audience
of 10,000 sympathetic listeners at the Cleveland Federation of
Labor's picnic on Labor Day was meant to be one of the cam-
paign's highlights. As Ruthenberg spoke, however, a cluster of
rowdy soldiers pushed their way to the front of the crowd and
demanded that he step down; they climbed onto the stage, shoving
and punching anyone who tried to stop them. They succeeded in
breaking up the assembly as thousands fled into the streets. Ul-
timately, Ruthenberg was not elected mayor, although he ran in
third place with 27,865 votes, more than double his tally for the
prior mayoral election. Two months later, in January of 1918, he
entered prison after his antirecruitment conviction was upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court, with Justice Brandeis joining a unani-
mous judgment that rejected a host of alleged criminal procedural
errors.29 He was released in December of that year, after serving
ten months on good behavior as a clerk-typist in the prison office.3"
1919 proved a life-transforming year for both Charles Ruth-
enberg and Anita Whitney. That year, both left socialism to be-
come communists, participated actively in the formation of com-
munist party branches, and were arrested under state criminal
syndicalism or anarchism statutes. In June, Ruthenberg joined
ninety-four delegates from twenty states at the Left Wing Con-
ference in New York to debate the means of overtaking the So-
cialist Party and transforming it into a Marxist working-class party
governed by communist principles. At the September national
"Quoted in id at 121.
28 The essential facts in the paragraph were derived from id at 117-21.
29 See Ruthenberg v United States, 245 US 480 (1918).
"5The essential facts in this paragraph were derived from Johnson at 122-37 (cited in
note 18).
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convention of the Socialist Party in Chicago, the left-wingers
abandoned the convention to begin the American Communist
movement, but the movement divided at birth into the Communist
Party of America (the more radical branch, led by Ruthenberg as
National Secretary) and the Communist Labor Party of America
(with Alfred Wagenknecht as Executive Secretary). The CLP's
National Program called for a "unified revolutionary working class
movement in America," recommended the general strike as a po-
litical weapon, and endorsed the Industrial Workers of the World
by declaring: "In any mention of revolutionary industrial unionism
in this country, there must be recognized the immense effect upon
the American labor movement of the propaganda and example of
the Industrial Workers of the World, whose long and valiant strug-
gle and heroic sacrifices in the class war have earned the affection
and respect of all workers everywhere." It was this tribute to the
IWW that would later prove to be Whitney's tribulation.31
Returning to California, the left-wing delegates were eager to
win over the Socialists for the newly formed Communist Labor
Party. Anita Whitney was among those who voted to change their
affiliation. The first convention of the Communist Labor Party
of California assembled at Loring Hall in Oakland on November
9; Whitney was selected as a member of the credentials and res-
olutions committees. After morale-boosting preliminaries-three
cheers for the Bolsheviki and some spirited singing-the conven-
tion got down to business. Most of the convention's energy was
consumed in a dispute over a resolution recognizing "the value of
political action." Whitney strongly backed the "political action"
resolution, but the majority feared that it represented no more
than a reversion to the parliamentarianism of the Socialist Party
and rejected it in favor of the more belligerent language of the
CLP National Program. That vote did not deeply alienate Anita:
she remained at the convention until it adjourned and subsequently
attended at least one state executive committee meeting of the
newly created party.32
"' The facts in this paragraph are substantiated in Draper at 17-20 (cited in note 18);
Johnson at 145-46 (cited in note 18); Richmond at 76-77, 110 (cited in note 17); Rubens
at 163-64 (cited in note 17); Blasi at 3 (cited in note 4).
12 The facts in this paragraph are substantiated in Richmond at 77-78 (cited in note
17); Blasi at 3-4 (cited in note 4); Shipman at 365 (cited in note 17); Friend William
Richardson, Case of Anita Whitney 2-3 (California gubernatorial papers, Nov 28, 1925)
(on file with authors). The official Communist Labor Party songbook included such wildly
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The Oakland Enquirer's next-day description of the convention
set off chain reactions for months to come. "The American flag
hung in one corner of the room," the story read. "But, during the
noon hour, a huge red cloth was hung so that the American flag
was no longer visible while the radicals prepared to adopt their
un-American constitution." On November 11, 400 American Le-
gion members and sympathizers raided Loring Hall; the rioters
hurled furniture, pictures, charters, and insignia from the Com-
munist Labor Party office windows, and set the place ablaze. (On
the same day, a Legionnaire raid of the IJVW hall in Centralia,
Washington, ended in a lynching of one IWW member.) In all of
this, the flames were fanned by national hysteria: having ordered
his infamous "red raids," Attorney General Mitchell Palmer de-
clared on November 14 that he had a list of 60,000 individuals,
both citizens and aliens, under Justice Department investigation.33
Two weeks after the Loring convention, eleven key figures in
the Communist Labor Party of California were arrested and
charged with criminal syndicalism. Effective on April 30 of 1919,
California's criminal syndicalism statute had been presented to the
legislature as an emergency measure for the "immediate preser-
vation of the public peace and safety," and had passed by unani-
mous vote of the senate and with only nine dissenting votes in
the assembly. The act defined "criminal syndicalism" as "any doc-
trine or precept advocating. . . the commission of crime, sabotage
. . . or unlawful acts of force and violence . . . as a means of
accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or
effecting any political change"; and it provided that any person
who "organizes or assists in organizing, or is or knowingly be-
comes a member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage
of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and
abet criminal syndicalism" is guilty of a felony punishable up to
fourteen years in prison.34 The act's chief target was the Inter-
national Workers of the World. The IWW had not only been
outlandish musical propaganda as the following: "Onward, Chrisian Soldiers! Rip and tear
and smite! / Let the gentle Jesus bless your dynamite . . . Onward, Christian Soldiers!
Eat and drink your fill. / Rob with bloody fingers, Christ O.K.'s the bill."
" The facts in this paragraph were drawn from Richmond at 83-89 (cited in note 17);
Hichborn at 11 (cited in note 20); Oakland Veterans Raid Communists, New York Times
(Nov 13, 1919), p 1.
" For an annotated text of the California criminal syndicalism act, see 23 California
Jurisprudence 1101-3 3.
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instrumental in orchestrating labor strikes and slowdowns to im-
prove conditions for industrial laborers and migratory farm work-
ers, but it was suspected of more nefarious and surreptitious deeds
in California: destroying hop kilns, burning wheat and hop fields,
placing phosphor bombs in haystacks and barns, among other
activities. With the criminal syndicalism law, California state au-
thorities now had a forceful weapon against the IWW, and strike
back it did: almost immediately, James McHugo, the IWW sec-
retary in Oakland, and dozens of IWW adherents were indicted
under the act. But the IWW was not to be the only target of
prosecution for criminal syndicalism, as Charles Ruthenberg and
Anita Whitney came to understand only too well.35
Ruthenberg was arrested on two separate occasions and under
two separate state laws before the turn of the year. Shortly after
Ohio's state legislature enacted its syndicalism statute, he was ar-
rested in July of 1919 at the Cleveland Socialist headquarters and
charged "with circulating copies of the Messenger . . .which ad-
vocates the Soviet form of government." With that indictment
still pending, Ruthenberg was arrested again on December 1-
this time in Chicago, following a telegram from New York au-
thorities that he had been indicted under New York's 1902 Crim-
inal Anarchy Law for publishing the Left Wing Manifesto, adopted
at the June conference, that advocated the forceful eradication of
established government. Whereas the Ohio charges were quietly
dismissed, the New York prosecution was set for trial in October
of 1920.36
In contrast, Anita Whitney could not have anticipated her crim-
inal syndicalism arrest. The Oakland Civic Center, an organization
of conservative middle- and upper-class "club women" who were
the wives of distinguished doctors, lawyers, professors, and public
officers, had asked the patrician communist to address them on
November 28. She delivered a dynamic speech on "The Negro
Problem in America," recounting the shameful history of slavery,
deconstructing the theory of black inferiority, and comparing cur-
" The essential facts in this paragraph were drawn from Richmond at 82-83, 88 (cited
in note 17); Richardson at I (cited in note 32); Woodrow C. Whitten, Trial of Charlotte
Anita Whitney, 15 Pacific Historical Rev 286, 292 n 36 (1946).
36 The essential facts in this paragraph derived from Johnson at 147-48 (cited in note
18); Most Arrested Red "in America" at 5 (cited in note 16); Two Convicted ofAnarchy: Ferguson
and Ruthenberg Given State's Prison Sentences, Washington Post (Oct 30, 1920), p 4; Radicals'
Release Ordered hy Court, New York Times (April 20, 1922).
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rent disparities in the economic and political power of the races.
What most grabbed Whitney's audience, however, was her shock-
ing statistics on and descriptions of the abhorrent practice of
lynching. Coming to a rousing conclusion, Whitney figuratively
wrapped herself in red, white, and blue: "It is not alone for the
Negro man and woman that I plead, but for the fair name of
America that this terrible blot on our national escutcheon may be
wiped away. . . . Let us then both work and fight to make and
keep her right so that the flag that we love may truly wave 'O'er
the land of the free / And the home of the brave.'
37
The club ladies applauded her; but upon her exit, she was ar-
rested. Detective Fenton Thompson informed the stunned fifty-
two-year-old communist stalwart that she was charged with crim-
inal syndicalism. Although Whitney was at that time the treasurer
of the Labor Defense League, an association formed to defend
and employ counsel for penniless defendants, she had sacrificed
so much of her own funds that she had insufficient resources to
make bail for herself. While her friends scrounged for bond
money, she was led to a cell, searched, and divested of her jewelry.
To her indignant allies, she had a characteristically humble answer:
"Why worry about it? They do it to others-hundreds of others.
Why not to me?" On December 30, Whitney's information was
filed: five counts, all drawn in the language of the relevant statute.
The first count charged: "the said Charlotte A. Whitney .. .
unlawfully, wilfully, wrongfully, deliberately and feloniously or-
ganize[d] and assist[ed] in organizing, and was, is, and knowingly
became a member of an organization, society, group and assem-
blage of persons organized and assembled to advocate, teach, aid
and abet criminal syndicalism." A demurrer to the information
was overruled, her request for a bill of particulars was denied, and
trial was set for January 27 of 1920. Thus began the case that
would later be known as Whitney v California.35
"' The essential facts in this paragraph were drawn from Richmond at 90-96 (cited in
note 17); Reubens at 163-64 (cited in note 17); Shipman at 365-66 (cited in note 17);
Anna Porter, The Case of Anita Whitney, New Republic (July 6, 1921), pp 165-66.
" The essential facts in this paragraph derived from Richmond at 96-98 (cited in note
17); Porter at 165-66 (cited in note 37); Shipman at 365-66 (cited in note 17); Brief for
Plaintiff-in-Error, Whitney v California, U.S. Supreme Court October Term, 1925-No
10 (Sept 4, 1925), pp 7-9 (available at http://curiae.law.yale.edu).
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C. WHITNEY'S WOES
Thomas H. O'Connor-a stocky man of intense energy, sharp
intellect, and charm-was one of San Francisco's legal "stars," a
criminal defense lawyer with a reputation for strategic brilliance
and rhetorical eloquence. His friend, Fremont Older (the social
activist editor of The Call), had so interested O'Connor in Anita
Whitney's case that he offered to represent her pro bono as lead
counsel. In contrast, his associate counsel, J. E. Pemberton (an
aging Socialist and country judge), was much less confident of his
competence as a trial lawyer. The O'Connor-Pemberton duo
would be up against John U. Calkins and Myron Harris as the
prosecuting attorneys, the latter a flag-waving orator. When
O'Connor first entered the courtroom of Superior Judge James
G. Quinn on Tuesday, January 27, 1920, the attorney did not
appear his typically vigorous and assured self. Explaining that the
distress and distraction caused by his young daughter's illness with
influenza had prevented him from preparing sufficiently for trial,
O'Connor asked Quinn for a continuance. The jurist would have
none of it, and demanded that the trial commence. On the second
day of voir dire, O'Connor himself was stricken with influenza,
but the judge showed no mercy: the jury of six women, six men,
and a female alternate had been chosen and were being held day
and night in custody at the state's cost,39 so the court was ready
to hear opening statements.4"
Myron Harris promised to prove the syndicalist nature of the
national Communist Labor Party with which Anita Whitney was
associated:
We will show that although she, herself, in expressions of opin-
ion, may have said that she was for changes by political action,
. . . that her every attitude and everything that she has done
Indeed, the jury's seclusion did cost Alameda County a pretty penny, although Judge
Quinn might never have imagined the extent of the damages. One account puts it col-
orfully: "[The jury] left Alameda County aghast with a bill of $3,000 [recall: in 1920
dollars] to cover its expenses. . . . [T]hose who did the condemning ate hearty breakfasts,
dinners and suppers, smoked fine cigars, kept themselves well groomed [with expensive
haircuts, shaves, and toilet articles], dipped into popular magazines at random. . . . One
paper commented: '[N]ext time it is anticipated that a trip to Palm Beach or the Canadian
Rockies may be thrown in as a sort of diversion."' Richmond at 113-14 (cited in note
17).
'The facts in this paragraph are substantiated in id at 98-101; Shipman at 366 (cited
in note 17); Whitten at 288 (cited in note 35).
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showed her to be a radical, not of the conservative Socialist
Party, but a member of the Communist Labor Party, which is
in violation of this law.
41
When Harris mentioned the Third International at Moscow and
the International Workers of the World, it became clear that the
prosecution aimed to associate Whitney with the Communist
Party of California, through it with the national party, and through
the latter with the Russian party and the radical JWW. The theory
of the state's case, in short, was "stacked up like the House that
Jack Built. Miss Whitney was a member of the Communist Labor
party, this party had endorsed another party, and members of that
other party had been convicted of 'criminal syndicalism.
'' 42
O'Connor immediately objected: Without charging Whitney
with membership and participation in a group that itself engaged
in criminal syndicalism, the prosecution's case rested solely on
guilt by a nebulous chain of associations. He moved for a directed
verdict after the prosecution's opening statement, butJudge Quinn
denied the motion. Now, it was O'Connor's turn to show the
defense's hand. Whitney's innocence would be demonstrated by
her own political beliefs and personal interactions with the Com-
munist Labor Party of California, all of which exhibited no pur-
pose or objective that might be characterized, beyond a reasonable
doubt, as criminal syndicalism.43
On Saturday, February 7, O'Connor died of influenza. Without
O'Connor to resist them, the state's attorneys transformed Anita
Whitney's trial into a prosecution of the IWW. A mountain of
evidence-approximately 60 percent of that introduced by the
prosecutors-substantiated the IWW's syndicalist character.
There was everything from IWW songs to excerpts of IWW-
circulated literature to testimony by professional witnesses of the
IWW's suspected destruction of industrial and agricultural prop-
erty. The twenty-some witnesses for the prosecution had built a
formidable case against the DAWW. But the IWW's connection to
Anita Whitney hung by a slender thread: the Communist Labor
Party of California, of which she was an organizing member, had
Quoted in id.
Shipman at 366 (cited in note 17). See also Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 10 (cited
in note 38).
4" The essential facts in this paragraph were derived from id at 10-11; Whitten at 288-89
(cited in note 35).
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adopted the Communist Labor Party of America's platform, which
in its section on industrial unionism endorsed the IWW as an
example of "the revolutionary industrial proletariat of America."
In short, Anita Whitney was criminally responsible because of this
tenuous nexus to the alleged syndicalist activities of certain mem-
bers of the IWVW.4
The defense relied on only two witnesses. First, there was Max
Bedacht, a National Executive Committee member for the Com-
munist Labor Party of America, who testified to a resolution passed
at the national convention" that might cast doubt on the state's
characterization of the CLP as a violent or terrorist organization.
Second, there was Anita Whitney. Taking the witness chair on
February 19, she asserted, in essence, that although she was a
member of the Communist Labor Party of California, she neither
understood nor intended it to be a vehicle of criminal syndicalism,
and it was neither her purpose nor that of the state party to engage
in violence, terrorism, or violation of any law.46
At the end of the trial, Judge Quinn instructed the jury as to
the California law of criminal syndicalism, but refused several of
the defense's requests for instructions. He did not instruct the jury
that Whitney could be convicted only if she specifically intended
to act in a way forbidden by the law.47 Whitney's lawyer did not
request that the court give an explicit "clear and present danger"
instruction-that is, whether at the time of Whitney's active as-
sociation with the Communist Labor Party of California, its ac-
tivities (including the endorsement of the IWVV) created a clear
and present danger of the sort of sabotage, terror, or violence
'The essential facts in this paragraph were derived from Richmond at 109-12 (cited
in note 17); Whitten at 291-92 (cited in note 35); Shipman at 366 (cited in note 17);
Richardson at 11 (cited in note 32); Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 10-17 (cited in note
38). It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court record in Whitney v California (on
file in the Supreme Court library) contains no complete transcript of the entire trial,
although it does contain transcripts of excerpted testimony by a substantial number of the
prosecution's witnesses.
" The resolution read in relevant part: "[T]he Communist Labor Party proclaims that
the term 'direct action' is not associated with terrorism, violence or any other perverted
meaning which capitalist lawmakers have given this phrase, but by it is meant such united
action by the workers on the job which they may use in forcing concessions from the
employing class directly without the use of the capitalist state." Cited in Whitten at 293
n 39 (cited in note 35).
46 The essential facts in this paragraph derived from id at 292-93; Shipman at 366 (cited
in note 17).
" See Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 15-17 (cited in note 38).
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prohibited as "criminal syndicalism" by California law. The im-
portance of that missing instruction would later become pivotal.
It took six hours on Friday, February 20, for the twelve jurors
to reach consensus: guilty on count 1 (knowing membership or
organization of an association "assembled to advocate, teach, aid
and abet criminal syndicalism"). After the court refused to extend
Whitney's bail of $2,000 pending an appeal, she was immediately
taken to the county jail. When she returned to Judge Quinn's
courtroom four days later to receive her sentence, the chamber
was packed. "As (Anita) entered," reporter Alma Reed described
in a special story for the New York Times, "I was present to witness
the silent tribute of 300 men and women prominently identified
with the leading social service and public welfare agencies of the
state. They arose as she passed down the aisle to her seat, and
they remained standing until sentence had been pronounced."
Whitney's allies were pained to hear the penalty: imprisonment
of one to fourteen years in San Quentin.4"
Whitney's conviction and sentence inspired sharply worded cri-
tique by the press on both sides of the divide. The Sacramento Bee
censured her for betraying her social and cultural status to consort
with outlaws. In contrast, the San Francisco Call commended her:
"The colonists were wrong when they burned witches; the people
were wrong when they spat upon the abolitionists. And the people
of California may be equally wrong when they send Anita Whitney
to prison."4 9 Moreover, a host of distinguished voices rose up to
condemn the injustices done to Whitney. Religious leaders, pol-
iticians, and civic and civil rights organizations pointed to the
Whitney case as a telling example of the perils of indiscriminate
red-baiting. 0
Anita Whitney was fifty-two years old when she was convicted,
and she would be sixty years of age before she finally emerged
from the shadow of prison. Her trek in the appellate process would
prove arduous, unpredictable, and long, lasting more than seven
years. The team of three who led that journey in its earliest stages
were John Coghlan and J. E. Pemberton, her trial lawyers, headed
" The citations from Alma Reeds's narrative in this paragraph and the next were taken
from Richmond at 114-16 (cited in note 17).
49The two newspaper quotations were reprinted in Reubens at 164 (cited in note 17).
o The facts in this paragraph derived from Richmond at 119-23 (cited in note 17).
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by John Francis Neylan. A "respectable, conservative California
legal talent," Neylan was a "Hearst lawyer and a prominent counsel
for a large number of local corporations."'" Whitney's appellate
team filed an opening brief (July 21, 1920) and a closing brief
(April 8, 1921) before the District Court of Appeal of California
in San Francisco, one of the state's six intermediate courts of
review. 2 Those briefs laid out a plan of attack against the criminal
syndicalism statute itself, and against its application to the "refined,
cultured, intellectual woman who has spent her life and private
fortune in charitable and philanthropic work for the relief and
betterment of her fellowmen." 3
The appeal moved along three strategic fronts:
1. The criminal information did not state the acts constituting a public
offense with enough particularity or in ordinary and concise lan-
guage: Thus, Whitney was denied "the right to be sufficiently
informed of the nature of the accusation against her, to enable
her to prepare her defense."54
2. The evidence presented by the prosecution at trial was insufficient
to justify the verdict: Anita Whitney may have held uncon-
ventional beliefs, but "mere opinion cannot be punished as
a crime.""5 Moreover, "[t]here is not one scrap of evidence
even remotely suggesting that she ever endorsed any act of
violence either by [the Industrial Workers of the World or
the Bolsheviks of Russia] or by individuals belonging to these
organizations. "56
s' Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times: 1918-1969, 85-86 (Harper & Row,
1972). But see Roger W Lotchin, John Francis Neylan: San Francisco Irish Progressive, in
The San Frisco Irish: 1850-1976, 86-110 (Smith McKay, 1978). Even so, this "progressive"
was highly critical of FDR: "[T]he nation and its people have been brought to the verge
of disaster by President Roosevelt." Addresses by John Francis Neylan: The Politician, The
Enemy of Mankind (privately printed pamphlet, 1938).
2 Appellant's Opening Brief in the California District Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District-Division One, The People of the State of California v Charlotte A. Whitney, Criminal
No 907 (July 21, 1920), reprinted as Exhibit A in Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error (cited in
note 38); Appellant's Closing Brief in the California District Court of Appeal, First Ap-
pellate District-Division One, The People of the State of California v Charlotte A. Whitney,
Criminal No 907 (April 8, 1921), reprinted as Exhibit B in Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error
(cited in note 38).
Appellant's Opening Brief at i (cited in note 52).
4 Id at iii-xviii.
15 Id at xix. See generally id at xix-xx.
56 Appellant's Closing Brief at xxiv (cited in note 52). See generally id at xxiv-xxviii.
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3. The California criminal syndicalism act is void for vagueness: If
it were "permissible to introduce in evidence manifestoes of
the Bolshevist Party of Russia to show the character of the
Communist Labor Party of Oakland," then the statute's
terms are too vague and indefinite to be susceptible to rea-
sonable definition. 7
All three arguments identified classic due process violations. No
specific First Amendment violations were alleged. Before the ap-
pellate court rendered its ruling, however, Whitney's counsel filed
a supplemental brief 8 to emphasize the federal unconstitutionality
of the California criminal syndicalism act and Whitney's convic-
tion. "We desire at this time to raise herein a federal question,"
the brief asserted. "[M]ere membership in an organization, without
the doing or commission of any overt act is not a crime; it is a
constitutional right and privilege; and the legislature cannot oth-
erwise provide.. . . By attempting to punish her for the exercise
of her legal and constitutional right, the state is abridging the
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States.1
5 9
None of the appellant's claims struck a chord with the California
District Court of Appeal. A three-judge bench unanimously up-
held Whitney's conviction on April 25, 1922.60 Running merely
five paragraphs, the opinion largely relied on California Supreme
Court precedent61 to reject the appellant's due process claims. The
only memorable section of the opinion was the court's depiction
of Whitney's purposes, if only because of its overheated rhetoric:
That this defendant did not realize that she was giving herself
over to forms and expressions of disloyalty and was, to say the
least, lending her presence and the influence of her character
and position to an organization whose purposes and sympathies
savored of treason, is not only past belief but is a matter with
57 Id at xlvii.
s Supplemental Brief for Appellant in the California District Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District-Division One, The People of the State of California v Charlotte A. Whitney,
Criminal No 907 (July 21, 1920), reprinted as Exhibit C in Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error
(cited in note 38).
s Id at lvii-lviii.
6 People v Whitney, 57 Cal App 449, 207 P 698 (1922).
6 See People v Taylor, 187 Cal 378, 203 P 85 (1921) (upholding a criminal syndicalism
conviction on the basis that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that the Com-
munist Labor Party of California, of which the defendant was an organizer and member,
constituted a syndicalist group within the meaning of the California law).
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which this court can have no concern, since it is one of the
conclusive presumptions of our law that a guilty intent is pre-
sumed from the deliberate commission of an unlawful act.
62
The worst fears of her appellate counsel had come true: Unless
this appellate ruling were overturned, Whitney had been tried and
convicted, and her conviction might stand, "not for any act of her
own," but because others with whom she was not proven "to have
had the slightest dealings started fires and carried poisons in other
parts of the State."63 The California Supreme Court denied Whit-
6 65ney's petition for review" without issuing an opinion.
Despite the slim chances for any case to be considered by the
U.S. Supreme Court, there were good reasons why the Court
might be interested in Whitney v California. The case had the
potential to make new law. The Court had yet to decide whether
the First Amendment rights of political speech and association
applied against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment; it
had yet to hold state regulation of expressive liberties to a higher
standard than reasonableness; and it had yet to determine the
circumstances in which a member of an organization should be
held responsible for the group's unlawful conduct.
To raise the odds of winning, John Francis Neylan needed some
heavyweights in the appellate bar to assist him. There was Walter
Heilprin Pollak of New York, who would soon argue before the
U.S. Supreme Court in Gitlow v New York66 and later in Powell v
62 57 Cal App at 452, 203 P at 699.
" Appellant's Opening Brief at xxi (cited in note 52).
14 Appellant's Petition for a Hearing by the Supreme Court, The People of the State of
California v Charlotte A. Whitney (June 3, 1922) (available at http://curiae.law.yale.edu).
" Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 2 (cited in note 38).
66 268 US 652 (1925). The Gitlow decision upheld the conviction of a radical Socialist,
who assisted the publication of the Left Wing Manifesto and the organization of the
Communist Labor Party of America, under New York's criminal anarchy statute. In dicta,
Justice Sanford's opinion of the Court assumed that liberties of speech and press were
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause against impairment by a
State. The majority determined, nevertheless, that a State, in the exercise of its police
power, could punish utterances tending to incite crime or disturb the public peace.
Enunciating what is known as the "bad tendency test," Sanford's opinion reasoned that
a State might "suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency." He declared: "[The State]
cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own . . .safety
until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace of im-
minent and immediate danger of its own destruction."
New York's criminal anarchy statute was understood to import the legislature's deter-
mination that such utterances were so inimical to the general welfare and involved such
danger of substantive evil that they could be penalized under the police power, and every
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Alabama67 (one of the famous Scottsboro cases).6" Walter Nelles
of New York also came on board. As counsel for the National
Civil Liberties Bureau, he had edited a book on the federal Es-
pionage Act cases69 before his involvement in Whitney; he would
argue Gitlow with Pollak; and subsequently he taught jurispru-
dence at the Yale Law School.7"
The Supreme Court granted a writ of error. After the case
record had been transferred to the Court, an unusual procedural
twist occurred. Whitney's attorneys filed a stipulation of the par-
ties before the California District Court of Appeal, and the court
issued an order on December 9, 1924, that amended the record
by including the following statement:
The question whether the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act (Statutes 1919, page 281) and its application in this case is
repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, providing that no state
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, and that all persons shall be accorded the
equal protection of the laws, was considered and passed upon
by this Court.7'
presumption had to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute. Because the statute
did not penalize the utterance of abstract doctrine or academic discussion but rather
denounced the advocacy of action for accomplishing the overthrow of organized govern-
ment by unlawful means, it was constitutional as applied to the Left Wing Manifesto's
advocacy of mass action progressively leading to industrial disturbances, mass strikes, and
revolutionary mass action aimed at destroying organized parliamentary government.
67 287 US 45 (1932). See generally Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American
South (Louisiana State University Press, 2nd ed, 1984).
68 See W H. Pollak Dies; Leader at Bar, 53, New York Times (Oct 3, 1940), p 25. First
Amendment scholar Zechariah Chafee remarked of Pollak after his death: "It is hard to
realize that a person so much alive as Walter Pollak can be dead. . . . He radiated generous
enthusiasm for justice, delight in mental activity, unexpected flashes of wit. We have lost
him when we need him most." Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Walter Heilprin Pollak, The Nation
(Oct 12, 1940), pp 318-19. For an account by his son (later Dean of the Yale and University
of Pennsylvania Law Schools and a federal judge), see Louis H. Pollak, Advocating Civil
Liberties: A Young Lawyer Before the Old Court, 17 Harv CR-CL L Rev 1 (1982).
69 Walter Nelles, Espionage Act Cases: With Certain Others on Related Points (National
Civil Liberties Bureau, 1918). Nelles also edited Law and Freedom Bulletins (National Civil
Liberties Bureau, 1920), including discussion of the 1917-20 prosecution and appeal of
IWW members in Chicago under the federal Selective Service and Espionage Acts. See
Haywood v United States, 268 F 795 (1920).
7" See Prof. Walter Nelles of Yale Law School. An Expert on Labor Injunction and Former
Lawyer Here Is Dead at Age of 53, New York Times (April 1, 1937), p 23.
"' Petition for Rehearing, Whitney v California, U.S. Supreme Court October Term,
1925, No 10 p. 2 (available at http://curiae.law.yale.edu).
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Securing such a state court "certificate" and amending the case
record for federal high court review was a lawyerly move that
Walter Pollak and Walter Nelles knew well. Indeed, they had done
exactly that in Gitlow.7 2 Now, once again, the savvy appellate ad-
vocates were looking down the road to avoid any possible pro-
cedural hurdles. The adequacy of the California District Court of
Appeal "certificate" was an issue that would cause legal delay and
confusion, but.ultimately would make the Supreme Court's review
possible.
D. RUTHENBERG'S RUIN
While Anita Whitney's criminal syndicalism case was still under
consideration in the California District Court of Appeal, Charles
Ruthenberg's criminal anarchy case was just beginning in the New
York State trial court system, where he faced charges for his ac-
tivities as national secretary of the Communist Party of America.
The prosecution relied heavily upon Ruthenberg's publication of
the Left Wing Manifesto that appeared in The Revolutionary Age
on July 5, 1919. Ruthenberg's defense "was to present frankly and
fully his reasons for thinking and acting as he did,"73 ensuring that
the state did not mischaracterize his views as incitement for vi-
olence. The jury convicted him, and he was sentenced to five to
ten years of hard labor at the Sing Sing state penitentiary. Eighteen
months later, the New York Court of Appeals reversed Ruthen-
berg's conviction on a technical statutory ground.74
Forty days later, Ruthenberg found himself once again on the
wrong side of the bars-this time in St. Joseph, Berrien County,
Michigan. The central executive committee of the Communist
72 See note 66; see also Philip B. Kurland and Gerhard Casper, eds, 23 Landmark Briefs
and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 530 (University
Publications of America, 1990).
1
3Johnson at 149 (cited in note 18).
74 The essential facts in this paragraph derived from id at 149, 152-53; Gitlow, Anarchist,
Gets Limit Sentence, New York Times (Feb 12, 1920), p 15; Grand Jury to Pass upon Radicals
Here, New York Times (July 14, 1919), p 15; New York Judge Orders Two Chicago Reds to
Prison Cells, Chicago Daily Tribune (Oct 30, 1920), p 12; Two Convicted ofAnarchy, Wash-
ington Post (Oct 30, 1920), p 4; Lawyer, a Convict, Argues for Release, New York Times
(April 15, 1922), p 6; Radicals' Release Ordered hy Court, New York Times (April 20, 1922),
p 15; New York v Ferguson, 234 NY 159, 136 NE 327 (1922) (reversing Ruthenberg's
conviction because the jury was wrongly allowed to infer that he was a manager or pro-




Party of America had called a national delegate convention for
late August of 1922. In advance of the convention, the seventy-
five delegates began gathering on Tuesday, August 15, at an iso-
lated summer resort in Bridgman, near St. Joseph; Ruthenberg
aimed to reconcile differences among various factions to ensure
united support at the convention for the newly formed Workers'
Party. A veil of secrecy covered the event: the delegates met in a
sand-dune amphitheater surrounded by woods; every individual
was given an alias and a numbered portfolio for documents; all
portfolios were collected and stored at night in two barrels that
were sunken in the ground and covered with sand and natural
debris; and all outside contact was forbidden.7"
Delegates from the Comintern of Moscow, the Red Trade In-
ternational of Moscow, and the Hungarian federation were there;
but so was a mole, a delegate clandestinely working for the Bureau
of Investigation in the U.S. Department of Justice. From August
15 to 22, the delegates debated and voted-until federal agents,
tipped off to the event, were spotted near the meeting place. Sus-
pecting an incipient police raid, the foreign delegates quickly ex-
ited and many others hurried off. Deputy U.S. marshals appeared
on the morning of August 22 to arrest the assembly.76
The information filed against Ruthenberg charged that he "did
voluntarily assemble with a certain society, group and assemblage
of persons, to wit, the Communist Party of America, formed to
teach and advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism."77 The
prosecution's main witness at trial was Francis Morrow, or "K-
97," the government agent who was a delegate to the Communist
Party's national convention. K-97 testified that Ruthenberg had
attended the Bridgman convention as a member of the Central
Executive Committee of the Communist Party of America, con-
travening the defense's claim that Ruthenberg had attended the
meeting as an advocate for the adoption of an open and legal
Workers' Party.7"
" The essential facts in this paragraph were drawn from People v Ruthenberg, 229 Mich
315, 321-22; 201 NW 358, 359-60 (1924); Johnson at 154 (cited in note 18); C. E.
Ruthenberg, Head of Communists, Dead, Washington Post (March 3, 1927), p 8.
76 The essential facts in this paragraph derived from Johnson at 154-56 (cited in note
18); People v Ruthenberg, 229 Mich at 323-23; 201 NW at 360 (cited in note 75).
" People v Ruthenberg, 229 Mich at 320; 201 NW at 359 (cited in note 75).
7 The essential facts in this paragraph derived from Johnson at 163 (cited in note 18);
Accused Burns in Red Trial, New York Times (April 21, 1923), p 15; Links Rutbenberg to
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Ruthenberg testified about and entered into evidence the pro-
posed program of the Workers' Party that he had introduced to
the delegates at Bridgman. On the one hand, as the defendant
pointed out, the program insisted that the party's function was to
be overtly political, rather than covertly subversive: "The class
struggle must take the form of a political struggle, a struggle for
the control of the government." On the other hand, there was text
that, at least in its tone, might be read as more threatening: "The
Workers' party declares one of its chief immediate tasks to be to
inspire in the labor unions a revolutionary purpose and to unite
them in a mass movement of uncompromising struggle against
capitalism." Similarly, the resolutions of a committee that Ruth-
enberg had steered, which were adopted unanimously at the Bridg-
man convention, had the same ambivalent quality; some appeared
to distance the Workers' Party from the illegal Communist Party
("A legal C.P. is now impossible. Should conditions change only
a convention can change the party's policy.") and others seemed
to maintain that integral link ("The illegal Communist party must
continue to exist and must continue to direct the whole Com-
munist work.").79
Striving to dispel any negative implications that might be drawn
from the Workers' Party program and resolutions, Ruthenberg
insisted that, although the program endorsed the ultimate control
of the American government by the working class, it did not ad-
vocate or teach crime, sabotage, violence, or other illegal forms
of terrorism as the means to bring about that end. At most, the
program did "nothing more than to predict that force, violence,
civil war and bloodshed will be the inevitable consequence of the
class struggle""° between the working class and the capitalist state.
But Ruthenberg's characterization of his personal and his party's
purposes was challenged, not only by K-97, but also by the damn-
ing inferences that could be derived from the illegal Communist
Party's effective control of the legal Workers' Party agenda. To
Reds: "K-97" Asserts He Was a Delegate at Raided Convention, New York Times (April 24,
1923).
7' All of the quotations in this paragraph referring to the Workers' Party program and
the adjustment committee's resolutions derived from People v Rnthenberg, 229 Mich at
332-33, 336-37; 201 NW at 363-65.
" Transcript of Record in the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1926,
Charles E. Ruthenberg, Plaintiff in Error v The People of the State of Michigan, No 44, p 189




that extent, the testimony of Jay Lovestone, the national secretary
of the Communist Party of America, who had participated actively
at the Bridgman convention, undercut the defense's theory of the
case. Addressing the purposes of the Workers' Party, Lovestone
stated unequivocally that "the members of the open party were to
carry out the policies of the Communist party" and the "Workers'
party . . . was in all respects a Communist organization."8"
Throughout the trial, the defense had argued that Michigan's
criminal syndicalism act, both on its face and as applied to Ruth-
enberg's participation at the Bridgman convention, violated state
constitutional and federal Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of
political speech and association. The defense would find yet other
grounds for objection when Judge White denied its specific re-
quests to charge the jury in conformity with its claims of consti-
tutional liberties.
In view of the existing state of federal free-speech law, the trial
court judge's instructions to the jury might well have been deemed
relatively unassailable. The judge began by enumerating the task
for the jurors:
It is not disputed that the convention held near Bridgman was
a meeting of the Communist Party of America, nor is it disputed
that the respondent was present at that meeting; which leaves
for your consideration these three questions: 1st. Was the Com-
munist Party of America, at the time the respondent assembled
with that organization . . .a society formed to teach and ad-
vocate criminal syndicalism? 2d. Was the Communist Party at
the time and place in question an assemblage to further the
alleged unlawful purposes of the organization? 3d. Did Charles
E. Ruthenberg assemble with the Communist Party voluntarily,
that is to say, with the conscious purpose and design to further
and aid the teaching and advocacy by the Communist Party of
the doctrines of criminal syndicalism?
8 2
In regard to the first question, the judge elaborated on the
difference between advocacy of communist sociopolitical theory
and advocacy of criminal syndicalism:
In order to establish that the Communist Party was at the time
and place in question an organization which taught and ad-
People v Ruthenberg, 229 Mich at 337-38; 201 NW at 365.
82 Transcript of Record at 190 (cited in note 80).
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vocated criminal syndicalism, the prosecution must satisfy you
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, not alone that
this party taught the theory that the social forces now in op-
eration would of their own momentum bring about an en-
counter of force between opposed social classes, but also that
this party taught and advocated crime, sabotage, violence and
terrorism as the method or one of the methods of accomplishing
the changes in the organization of society desired by the com-
munists."
Significantly, however, the judge refused two instructions re-
quested by the defense that aimed to infuse the "clear and present
danger" test into the interpretation of the statute. 4 Considering
the evidence and the instructions, few were surprised when the
jury reached a verdict of guilty on May 2, 1923."
Ruthenberg's brief to the Michigan Supreme Court was filed
on September 19, 1924.86 It challenged the criminal syndicalism
act as unconstitutional on its face and as applied, under both the
Michigan Constitution and the federal Fourteenth Amendment,
on several grounds:87
13 Id at 191.
14 Rejected request no. 12 read:
You are instructed, in further definition of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism,
that the statute is directed against the teaching and advocacy of crime, sabotage,
violence and other unlawful methods of terrorism as an immediate program of
action. If you find from the evidence that the Communist Party, at the time and
place alleged, was an organization which taught the desirability of revolutionary
changes in our social institutions, but did not teach or advocate that anyone
should proceed presently to commit acts of crime, sabotage, violence, or ter-
rorism, then it is not established that the assemblage in question constituted a
violation of the statute and you should declare the respondent not guilty.
And rejected request no. 13 read:
[For there to be teaching and advocacy within the contemplation of the statute,]
the time and circumstances must be such that the teaching or advocacy of the
prohibited doctrines presents a clear and imminent danger that acts of crime,
sabotage, violence or terrorism may result from the advocacy. If you find ...
that no circumstances have been presented in evidence making manifest a clear
and imminent danger of such acts of criminal injury on account of the teachings
and advocacies of the Communist Party, then your verdict should be not guilty.
Id at 199.
s' Id at 237.
86 Rutbenberg Files Appeal, New York Times (Sept 20, 1924), p 18.
17 In addition to the claims enumerated in the text, Ruthenberg alleged that the trial
court erred by (1) overruling the defendant's challenge to a juror, (2) denying the defen-
dant's motion for a bill of particulars, and (3) denying the defendant's motion to suppress
evidence found in his suitcase at the Bridgman convention on the basis that the state
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1. On its face, the Michigan criminal syndicalism act is void for
vagueness: the provisions of the Michigan statute "are too
vague, uncertain and indefinite to form the basis of a pros-
ecution for crime.""
2. On its face, the Michigan criminal syndicalism act violates freedoms
of speech and association guaranteed by the state constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment: the Michigan statute punishes "as
a felony the enunciation of a doctrine without the intent, the
occasion, . . . or the imminent result of such enunciation,"
in violation of state and federal guarantees of free speech
and association. 9
3. As applied, the Michigan criminal syndicalism act violates Ruth-
enberg's freedoms of speech and association guaranteed by the state
constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment: by the information
or evidence adduced by the state at trial, it does not appear
(a) "that the assemblage in question by any teaching or ad-
vocacy gave rise to imminent danger of criminal injury to
any persons or property, or to any governmental establish-
ment or operation, or to the public peace or welfare in any
respect," and (b) "that there was any attempt or intent, either
by the alleged unlawful assemblage or by [Ruthenberg] as a
participant therein, to solicit, induce, incite or promote any
acts of criminal injury under circumstances involving a clear
and present danger of the consummation of such injury."90
These arguments were brushed aside by the Michigan Supreme
Court. On December 10, 1924, the court unanimously upheld
Ruthenberg's conviction. To the claim of vagueness, the court
declared: "The naivete of this should make a Communist smile.
One need read but little to discover what the terms sabotage and
violence mean. . .. Sabotage has had a well understood meaning
ever since French industrial workers threw their sabots, or wooden
shoes, into machinery."'" Ruthenberg's second claim of facial un-
violated his constitutional right against a wrongful search and seizure. The Michigan
Supreme Court rejected these claims with dispatch. See People v Ruthenberg, 229 Mich at
326-31, 201 NWVat 361-63.
"Transcript of Record at 236 (cited in note 80).
89 Id.
90 Id.
9' People v Ruthenberg, 229 Mich at 325; 201 NW at 361.
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constitutionality fared no better: "This statute reaches an abuse
of the right to freely speak, write and publish sentiments, and is
squarely within the accountability allowed to be exacted. . .. The
reasons advanced here against the constitutionality of the act have
been urged against similar acts in other jurisdictions and found
to have no merit.
92
Most of the court's vehemence was reserved for Ruthenberg's
as-applied argument. Excerpting lengthy passages from the Work-
ers' Party program and resolutions adopted at the Bridgman con-
vention, borrowing pieces from Jay Lovestone's testimony, and
much more, the court painted as colorful a portrait as possible of
Ruthenberg's syndicalist status:
Defendant was acting under orders from Moscow. He was
pledged to obey such orders and, under this record, it taxes
credulity too far to believe he was endeavoring to bring Com-
munist doctrines and tactics within the law. . . . [His purpose]
was to further the ends of the underground or illegal party, and
that purpose and such ends center upon the destruction of re-
publican or parliamentary form of government by direct action
and criminal force.93
And what of "clear and present danger"? This, too, was dis-
missed with fervor:
The Communists say they are but prophets of disorder, vi-
olence and destruction eventually to come. In the sweet bye
and bye, they say, resistance to their schedule will lead to the
shedding of blood but the guilt will rest upon those who fight
to maintain government under the Constitution of the United
States. But they are militant prophets, to say the least, with
present activities toward fulfillment of what they prophesy.
Prophecy of violence to come does not mantle present militant
organization and criminal activities to hurry its advent.
Quaint Old Thomas Fuller, 275 years ago, hit off defendant's
plea of present innocent advocacy of eventual force and violence
when he said: "It is dangerous to gather flowers that grow on
the banks of the pit of hell, for fear of falling in; yea, they which
play with the devil's rattles will be brought by degrees to wield
92 People v Ruthenberg, 229 Mich at 323-24; 210 NW at 360.
People v Ruthenberg, 229 Mich at 331-32, 339-40; 210 NW at 363, 365-66.
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his sword; and from making of sport, they come to doing of
mischief."94
On January 5, 192 5, Ruthenberg was sentenced to serve between
three and ten years in the Jackson state prison. He served only
twenty days of his term before he was released. His attorneys had
petitioned Justice Louis Brandeis for a writ of error enabling them
to seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court of the Michigan court's
judgment in People v Ruthenberg. Brandeis granted the writ of error
on January 19, ordering that the writ would operate as a super-
sedeas upon providing a bond for $7,500. (Earlier, Justice James
C. McReynolds had refused to grant Ruthenberg such a writ.) The
bail bond was delivered and approved on January 26, and Ruth-
enberg was once again at liberty-just in time to deliver an address
at the first annual Lenin memorial meeting in Madison Square
Garden.9"
II. THE SUPREME COURT STORY: THE Two MINDS OF Louis
BRANDEIS
The story of the Whitney and Ruthenberg appeals is the
story of the two minds of Louis Brandeis. One case he didn't want
to decide, but was forced to; the other he did want to decide, but
was unable to. One case impelled him to apologetic concurrence;
the other provoked him to uninhibited dissent. One case was to
be resolved by procedural rules; the other on the merits with a
new vision of the First Amendment. All of this changed unex-
pectedly-and the two minds of Louis Brandeis melded into one.
A. IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED . . .
With Anita Whitney's case still pending before the Supreme
Court (and held over to be considered along with Ruthenberg v
Michigan in the October term of 1925), her legal team mulled over
the arguments that might finally win the day. Their brief focused
94 People v Ruthenberg, 229 Mich at 353-54; 210 NW at 370.
"s The essential facts in this paragraph were drawn from Johnson at 164-65 (cited in
note 18); Ruthenberg Is Sentenced, Los Angeles Times (Jan 6, 1925), p 1; U.S. High Court
to Hear Plea of Ruthenberg, Chicago Tribune (Jan 23, 1925), p 10; Ruthenberg May Win
Review by High Court, New York Times (Jan 23, 1925), p 2; Order Allowing Writ of Error,
in Transcript of Record at 241 (cited in note 80); Ruthenberg Out on Bail: Released Pending
Appeal, He Will Speak at Lenin Meeting Here, New York Times (Jan 27, 1925), p 10.
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on the state's infringement of Whitney's liberties of assembly,
speech, and association protected under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the brief contended
that a "statute which is applied to attach penal consequences to
joining an organization still in its formative stage, because that
organization subsequently acquires over defendant's protests a
questionable character, imposes a 'previous restraint' upon the
right of assembly." Moreover, the brief argued that the Communist
Labor Party of California's convention of November 9, 1919, had
no quality of incitement, and that Whitney's conviction would
have violated due process even if she had participated in all the
purposes and activities of the convention. This was so because
nothing short of "incitement to violent action" can be punished
without infringing the rights of free speech and assembly. Distin-
guishing Whitney's case from Gitlow, in which the Left Wing
Manifesto was held to be a call to illegal mass action, the brief
stressed that the program of Whitney's party (recognizing the
"long and valiant struggles and heroic sacrifices" of the IWW "in
the class-war") was no more than a "generalized statement of col-
lective sympathy," and could not be construed as any type of in-
citement, much less the "direct incitement" found in Gitlow.96
Whitney's counsel anticipated that the trial record could be
viewed as providing scant basis for the Supreme Court's assertion
of federal question jurisdiction. The brief, accordingly, emphasized
the "certificate"-the stipulation of the parties and order of the
California intermediate court of appeal-in establishing that ju-
risdictional basis:
In the District Court of Appeal and also upon her application
for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of California, Miss
Whitney contended that the statute "and its application in this
case is repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States. . .. "(Stipulation
and addition to the record, filed Dec. 16, 1924). That contention
"was considered and passed upon" by the District Court of
Appeal-the highest California Court to which appeal was per-
mitted-and was overruled by that court (Order amending
record).97
96 See note 66. The essential facts of this paragraph derive from Brief for the Plaintiff-
in-Error at 66-84 (cited in note 38).
" Id at 4 (omitting page numbers for the transcript of record).
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Two years after the Court had agreed to review Whitney v Cal-
ifornia, oral arguments were finally heard on October 6, 1925.
From the tenor of the Justices' questions, they appeared most
concerned over the precise character of Anita Whitney's involve-
ment with the Communist Labor Party of California. They closely
questioned counsel as to whether Whitney had attended party
meetings after the Loring Hall organizing convention, and
whether she had put her weight behind any syndicalist proposal
or action. Given the Court's parsing of the merits, it must have
been a surprise when its decision was rendered thirteen days later.
The Court's one-line per curiam opinion dismissed the case for
want of jurisdiction.98
However bleak things looked at that time, Anita Whitney still
had a chance in the court of public opinion. Talk of pardon was
everywhere in the California air, and an "Anita Whitney Com-
mittee" was soon formed to rally public support. But Whitney
would have none of it. "I'm not going to ask for a pardon," she
told an Associated Press reporter. "If the Governor is disposed to
pardon anyone, let him liberate the poor men who are now im-
prisoned for violation of this same law and whose guilt may be
less than mine." In any event, Governor Friend W Richardson
released a thirteen-page statement denying the pardon. For the
governor, the simple truth was that Anita Whitney had assisted
the Communist Labor Party, an organization that had engaged in
"sedition and disloyalty amounting to almost treason." 99
Whitney's lawyers were confident that the Supreme Court had
not fully appreciated the jurisdictional base for appeal that they
laid when they had sought a certificate from the California District
Court of Appeal. Accordingly, they filed a petition for rehearing.'°°
"This court acted under a misapprehension of the facts," the pe-
tition explained. The state intermediate appellate court's "order
and the stipulation upon which it was entered did not constitute
an attempt to confer jurisdiction upon this court by consent."
"8 The essential facts in this paragraph derived from State Act Up in Highest Court, Los
Angeles Times (Oct 7, 1925), p 3; Whitney v California, 269 US 530 (1925).
99 The essential facts of this paragraph were drawn from Woman Syndicalist Will Not
Seek Pardon, New York Times (Oct 22, 1925), p 7 (AP story); War Group in Whitney Case,
Los Angeles Times (Nov 4, 1925), p 7; Whitney Case Details Given, Los Angeles Times
(Nov 27, 1925), p 6; Richmond at 131-36 (cited in note 17); Richardson at 13 (cited in
note 32).
" Petition for Rehearing (cited in note 71).
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Rather, "the stipulation and order stated the actual facts concern-
ing the raising of. . .Federal questions in the California District
Court of Appeal, and the stipulation was entered into and the
order was made for the purpose of enabling these actual facts to
appear in the record.""1 '
It is unusual for the Supreme Court to grant review in a case,
hear oral arguments, and then withdraw its jurisdiction. It is still
more unusual for the Justices to rehear such a case when their
jurisdiction remains highly doubtful. But on December 14, 1924,
the Court agreed to take a second look at Whitney v California.
The Justices, or a majority of them, wanted to decide this case,
and they were unwilling to let possible jurisdictional barriers stand
in their way. Rehearing was rescheduled for March 15, 1926.1°2
B. BRIEFLY PUT
In late February of 1926, Ruthenberg's lawyers filed their brief for
plaintiff in error in the U.S. Supreme Court. 3 Mindful of procedural
snags, they devoted several pages to establishing federal jurisdiction
based on what had been expressly claimed at various stages of the
case. Before proceeding to the specific "errors intended to be
charged," the brief stressed the issue of imminence:
Under the interpretation of the statute given to the jury, it made
no difference that the assembly at Bridgman did not then and
there advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. . . . It is
enough that somewhere and [sometime] there had been formed a
party to teach and advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism,
and that this meeting at Bridgman "was called and for the purpose
of promoting, carrying out and furthering the fundamental gen-
eral designs and objects of the party." (emphasis in original)
o' Id at 2.
012 Briefs were filed by Whitney's counsel and the state's attorney reiterating the same
arguments, substantive and procedural, that they had made in earlier briefs, although to
some degree with stronger analysis and precedential authority. See Supplementary Brief
for Plaintiff-in-Error, Whitney v California, U.S. Supreme Court October Term, 1925-
No 10 (available at http://curiae.law.yale.edu); Brief of Defendant-in-Error on Rehearing,
Whitney v California, U.S. Supreme Court October Term, 1925-No 10 (March 10, 1928)
(available at http://curiae.law.yale.edu).
0 The following summary of Ruthenberg's arguments derives from Brief for Plaintiff-
in-Error, Ruthenberg v Michigan, U.S. Supreme Court October Term, 1925-No 44 (Feb
27, 1926), pp 2-8, 13-14, 16-19, 21-24, 33-36, 42-46, 53 (brief on file at the Library of
the U.S. Supreme Court, Washington, DC).
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Addressing that point more fully, the brief emphasized that the
"record presents, in a general way, three versions of the doctrines
of the Communist Party." One of those doctrines ("Marxian the-
ories") was largely philosophical, while another (derived from iso-
lated passages selected from isolated documents collected by the
prosecution) was inflammatory, while yet another version of Com-
munist Party doctrine (proffered by the defense) was innocently
organizational. If, indeed, there were three versions of Communist
doctrine, could the State select one, ignore the others, and proceed
to convict Ruthenberg without violating his right to due process?
Among the arguments offered by Ruthenberg's lawyers were the
following:
1. First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights ofAssembly Violated: This
argument distinguished Gitlow and made several specific
points, such as
Crime ofAssembling: "The crime of 'assembling' is an absolute
novelty in American law. This is the only case of record in all
our law books . .. in which the judgment depends solely on a
charge of assembling with a society devoted to the propagation of
a certain form of doctrine." (emphasis in original). That is, the
"act of 'assembling' takes its criminal quality from the an-
tecedent character of the society with which the accused as-
sembles, not from any actual advocacy of criminal syndicalism
that is aided or instigated by his act of assembling."
Opinion vs. Incitement: "One may be an anarchist and give
frequent expression to his anarchistic belief without running
afoul of the [criminal syndicalism] statute. An utterance with-
out incitement-quality and incitement-intent is not criminally
punishable." Indeed, "[uintil opinion by its form and intent passes
over this realm of incitement it is beyond the reach of the police
power"
" Conspiracy: The crime with which Ruthenberg was charged
smacked of the more traditional crime of conspiracy, which
the brief was quick to distinguish: "the charge laid out in this
case and the evidence by which it is supported do not fall
within the classification of conspiracy. It was not alleged or
proved that the plaintiff in error, at the time and place of
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the supposed felony, entered into a certain plan and agree-
ment with other persons to undertake the future dissemi-
nation in some form of the doctrine of criminal syndicalism."
If the idea of conspiracy can be detached from the logic of
the state syndicalism law, what then is the purpose of such
a law other than to penalize beliefs?
2. State Syndicalism Law is Beyond the "Police Power": The brief
explained that the Michigan law contravened the State's lawful
police powers because the "statute does not require that the
said act of assembling shall present or manifest a clear and
present danger of overt criminal injury or public disturbance."
3. The State Law is Impermissibly Vague: The "provisions of the
said statute," the brief concluded, "are too vague, uncertain,
and indefinite to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt, in
contravention of the due process provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
The State's brief made the standard arguments of the day in a
standard way. It tendered two basic arguments:104
1. Limited Scope ofRight to Assembly: The Fourteenth Amendment
right of assembly urged by Ruthenberg is limited to "peaceable
assemblies to perform the duties or exercise the privileges of
citizens to petition the legislature for a redress of grievances."
It does not extend, by contrast, to "advocacy of the doctrines
of armed mass action, insurrection and civil war for the violent
and forcible overthrow and destruction of organized govern-
ment, .. .which are the fundamental tenets of the Com-
munist Party of America."
2. Valid Exercise of "Police Power": "The right 'peacefully to as-
semble,"' the brief maintained, "does not deprive the state of
Michigan of the primary and essential right of self-preserva-
tion, nor does the Fourteenth Amendment limit the power of
the State of Michigan to deal with crimes, and this is true
even though the statute makes intent unnecessary as an ele-
ment of the offense."
"04 The summary of the State's arguments derives from Brief for Defendant-in-Error,
Ruthenberg v Michigan, U.S. Supreme Court October Term, 1925-No 44 (April 26, 1926),
pp 6-11 (brief on file at the Library of the U.S. Supreme Court, Washington, DC).
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Notably, the State's brief lacked any detailed discussion of exactly
how Ruthenberg's association with the Communist Party of Amer-
ica amounted to the kind of criminal syndicalism likely to produce
a clear and present danger.
As the draft opinions in Ruthenberg v Michigan were circulated
for consideration, one thing was becoming increasingly obvious: It
would be Gitlow v New York all over again-Sanford writing for the
majority with Brandeis and Holmes in dissent. Justice Sanford was
moving along the same tracks that he had in Gitlow, wherein he
wrote:
Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of
the statute. . . And the case is to be considered "in the light
of the principle that the State is primarily the judge of regulations
required in the interest of public safety and welfare"; and that
its police "statutes may only be declared unconstitutional where
they are arbitrary or unreasonable attempts to exercise authority
vested in the State in the public interest.'
05
The Ruthenberg majority had not moved a doctrinal inch from its
position in Gitlow, in which Justice Sanford approvingly echoed the
view of others:
"Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy
of a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the government
without waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of
the success of the plan advocated. If the State were compelled
to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, then its
right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with
the overthrow of the government, when there would be neither
prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law."'° 6
And Gitlow was nothing if not a reaffirmation of the bad tendency
test: "In such case it has been held that the general provisions of
the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific utterance
of the defendant if its natural tendency and probable effect was to
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might
prevent."07
l0s 268 US at 669.
106 Id at 669-70 (quoting People v Lloyd, 304 11 23, 35, 136 NE 505, 512 (1922)).
107 Id at 671.
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What was different in Ruthenberg was that Brandeis, rather than
Holmes,' was now penning the dissent (App. A)."0 9 Brandeis, like
Holmes before him, refused to yield to Sanford's reaffirmation of
the bad tendency test. But Brandeis was doing something more than
reaffirming the clear and present danger test; he was moving beyond
it-and with Holmes's approval.
Brandeis spoke of Holmes's "clear and present danger" formu-
lation as if it were the starting point of his constitutional analysis,
and stressed the importance of analytical clarity: "We must bear in
mind. . . the wide difference legally between assembling and con-
spiracy, between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and
attempt." Before proceeding to either his own reworking of
Holmes's test or any application of the law to the facts of the case,
Brandeis's Ruthenberg dissent informed his readers of the values to
be safeguarded by his notion of the First Amendment. He wrote
with the grace and democratic fervor of Walt Whitman: "In a de-
mocracy public discussion is a political duty. This principle lies at
the foundation of the American system of government. Freedom
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispen-
sable to the discovery and spread of political truth. Without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile."" 0 Combining that
poetic elegance with Enlightenment reasoning, he went on to add
what would become memorable lines:
Those who won our independence by revolution valued liberty
both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the
secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They
recognized that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people;
that the greatest menace to stable government is repression; and
that the fitting remedy for evil counsels good ideas. Believing in
00 Id at 672-73 (Holmes dissenting).
'09 The quotations in Brandeis's Ruthenherg dissent that follow derived from Unpublished
Draft of Brandeis Dissenting Opinion in Ruthenberg v Michigan, dated Oct 1, 1926, in
The Louis Brandeis Papers: Part I, 1916-1931 (Harvard Legal Manuscripts, Harvard Law
School Library), microfilm reel 34, frames 00351-00360.
10 What David Cole said of Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney holds equally true for
his draft dissent in Ruthenberg: "As Holmes had done in Abrams, Brandeis retained the
outline of the Schenck clear and present danger test, but filled it with new meaning,
substituting an essentially political justification for Holmes's quasi-economic reliance on
the discovery of truth through free trade in ideas. Brandeis, who never used Holmes'
market metaphor, shifted the focus of the First Amendment from the pursuit of tran-
scendent truth to subjective individual freedom and intersubjective political deliberation."
David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 Yale
L J 857, 888 (1986) (footnote omitted).
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the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they
eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its
worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing
majorities, they amended the Constitution so as to guarantee free
speech and assembly.
Returning to doctrine, Brandeis categorically rejected Gitlow and
the majority in Ruthenberg: "Only an emergency can justify re-
pression. Mere bad tendency of the utterance cannot." Tweaking
Holmes's test while giving it greater staying power, Brandeis then
declared: "[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear
and present, unless the incidence of evil apprehended is so imminent
that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion."
Moreover, "even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohi-
bition of functions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil
apprehended is relatively serious."
Brandeis's draft dissent was equally striking in the lengths to
which it went to apply the Justice's vision of the First Amendment
to the facts in the case. The discussion of Communist doctrine was
so extensive in Ruthenberg that it might have made the petitioner
happy to have such information readily available in a nationally
distributed government document. "The [Party] teaching is that
American Democracy is a fraud," wrote Brandeis, "that not merely
the practice, but the form of our government makes it the effective
instrument of capitalist control." Such descriptions might have
struck some as out of place, because their very presentation might
be understood as an expression of sympathy. But the progressive
Brandeis spared no adjectives in expressing his disdain for the
Party's "foul" or "noxious doctrine" made possible by the "dicta-
torship of the proletariat." Even so, he felt the need to remind
Americans: "Those who won our independence by revolution valued
liberty both as an end and as a means." In other words, the ideal
of revolution need not be judged as un-American.
The draft of the Ruthenberg dissent was relentless in its dem-
onstration that the Communist Party of America, as constituted in
1922, posed no "imminent danger that some evil might result from
Ruthenberg's assembling with [it]." More accurately, no such danger
reasonably could have been inferred from the record as presented
in the case. Drawing on that record and on matters of "judicial
notice," Brandeis declared:
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* "There is no suggestion of sabotage. In fact, the Party rejects
as absurd the theory that the revolution can be accomplished
by the direct seizure of industry without first overthrowing the
capitalist state."
" "The predicted use of force in the final struggle by which the
communist state is to be substituted in America for the capi-
talistic was in 1922 a remote contingency."
" "The Party had then less than six thousand members, scattered
throughout the United States. Of these, all but five thousand
were foreign born-persons apparently of small means and un-
familiar with the English language."
" "Even if all the resources, intellectual and financial, of the Rus-
sian Soviet Republic were to be devoted to propaganda here,
the process of converting any substantial portion of the thirty
million American workers to revolutionary views would nec-
essarily be a slow one."
" "If the only evil apprehended was illegal violence in the final
struggle, there could be no basis for a claim that mere assem-
blage with this society, although formed to advocate the noxious
doctrine, would create imminent danger of the evil."
" "[W]hile the criminal state of mind was to be developed, the
time was apparently not then deemed ripe for putting foul
doctrines into practice, either as a means of preparation and
education or otherwise."
" "There is not even a suggestion that Ruthenberg had, in any
connection, committed, or attempted or conspired to commit,
or had incited any other person to commit, any act of violence
or terrorism."
" "[There was not] a particle of evidence [introduced] that these
delegates, or any of the Party's officers, had advocated resort
in the near future to crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of preparation for accom-
plishing industrial or political reform, or for any other purpose,
either in Michigan or elsewhere in the United States, or had
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attempted or conspired or threatened to resort, or had incited
any other person to resort to such means of preparation."
Little remained to be done, save perhaps some last minute proof-
ing by the clerks. Sanford and his colleagues had prevailed again,
but at least this time Brandeis had raised a formidable lance in
dissent. This dissent would be remembered much the same way
that Holmes's dissent in Abrams". would be remembered. Brandeis
dissenting in Ruthenberg-it would in time become a familiar phrase
in American law.
It had been 10 months since the Justices heard oral arguments
in Ruthenberg v Michigan. The time had arrived for the Court printer
to release the opinions. But something unexpected happened. On
March 3, 1927, there was a story in the Washington Post bearing the
headline: "C. E. Ruthenberg, Head of Communists, Dead."
1'1 2
His death came as a complete surprise, except to a few in his
inner circle. A week or so earlier, while Ruthenberg was in New
York, he had doubled up in pain in his hotel room, this in the
presence of friends who expressed concern and urged him to see a
doctor. "No," he replied, "I've got to get to that meeting in Chi-
cago." When the pain subsided, he was off on a train to the windy
city to attend another Party meeting. His friend and ideological
ally, William Z. Foster, was concerned at how pale he looked when
they met in Chicago. "You look sick, Charley," he said. To which
came the reply: "Yes, Bill, I'm kind of under the weather." A few
hours later Ruthenberg collapsed and was taken immediately to the
American Hospital. The doctors performed an emergency appen-
dectomy, but to no avail. Three days later, on March 2, 1927,
Charles Emil Ruthenberg was dead at forty-four-acute peritoni-
tis.
113
An honor guard flanked the body as it lay in state at the Ashland
Boulevard Auditorium in Chicago. A long line of mourners passed
by. There was a funeral march to Graceland Cemetery Chapel. Later
Ruthenberg's body was cremated and his ashes were taken in a bronze
urn to New York's Manhattan Lyceum. Later still, the urn (inscribed,
250 US 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes dissenting).
,12 Washington Post (March 3, 1927), p 8.
"3 The facts in this paragraph derived largely from Johnson at 177-78 (cited in note
18); Draper at 243-47 (cited in note 18).
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"Our Leader, Comrade Ruthenberg") was taken by a special guard
wearing red shirts and black armbands to memorial meetings at Car-
negie Hall, Central Opera House, and the New Star Casino. Some
10,000 comrades flocked to the memorial events to stand, one last
time, with Ruthenberg. In Russia, too, they saluted him. At the official
request of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, his ashes were
sent to Moscow to rest beneath the Kremlin wall. He was the last
American to receive that "honor."
'' 4
The case that had been so important to Brandeis-both in terms
of articulating his vision of First Amendment law and in applying
it-was now lost. Within a week, the writ of error in Ruthenberg v
Michigan (No. 44) was dismissed." 5
C. CHANGING HORSES IN MID-STREAM
Even before Charles Ruthenberg died and his writ of error was
dismissed, the Court divided along the same lines in its treatment
of Whitney. Seven Justices intended to dispose of Whitney on the
merits, presumably along the same lines of reasoning as in Ruth-
enberg,116 and Justices Brandeis and Holmes planned to concur in
the judgment alone. Brandeis prepared a lackluster two-paragraph
opinion (App. B)" 7 largely contesting the majority's assumption
of jurisdiction. After noting the petitioner's failure to raise the
issue of clear and present danger in the state courts, Brandeis
obliquely declared: "[T]here was evidence on which the court or
jury might have found that such [a clear and present] danger ex-
isted." Accordingly, he conceded that "the judgment of the state
court cannot be disturbed."
Had Brandeis left his draft concurrence in Whitney untouched,
the history of First Amendment law would have been deprived of
..4 The facts in this paragraph derived largely from Johnson at 177-78 (cited in note
18); Draper at 243-47 (cited in note 18); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Hitched to a Red Star,
New York Times (July 24, 1960), Book Review, p 3.
... Ruthenberg v Michigan, 273 US 782 (1927).
116 We can only speculate here, since we have been unable to locate the original majority
opinion in Ruthenherg and the earliest drafts of the majority opinion in Whitney. Never-
theless, given the arguments made by Justice Brandeis in his unpublished Ruthenberg
dissent, it is clear that the majority had planned to reach the merits. Likewise, the un-
published early draft of Brandeis's Whitney concurrence establishes that the majority had
never planned to dismiss the case for procedural reasons.
"' A draft of Brandeis's original concurrence in Whitney is contained in his papers, and
is virtually identical to what was set out in the final two paragraphs of the published
opinion. It is reprinted as Appendix B.
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"one of the great majestic, stirring tributes to freedom of expres-
sion."' But he did not. He seized much of his rhetoric and rea-
soning in Ruthenberg, and reworked it. Sometimes lifting whole
passages with minor modifications, sometimes rearranging phrases
and sentences, and sometimes inserting new observations, Bran-
deis infused brilliance, vitality, and eloquence into his Whitney
opinion.
On May 16, 1927-more than five years after the start of Whit-
ney's trial-the Court issued its decision in Whitney v California."9
Whitney's conviction was upheld by a unanimous Court. Justice
Sanford, the author of Gitlow, wrote for the majority of seven
Justices who viewed Whitney as tantamount to a Gitlow "bad ten-
dency" case. 12' Little need be said here about the majority's opin-
ion, other than that in its unusually generous grant of review,
Sanford felt obliged to declare: "[T]he usual course here taken to
show that Federal questions were raised and decided below is not
to be commended . *.".., In contrast, the opinion was ungen-
erous in its grant of free-speech protection. The Fourteenth
Amendment notwithstanding, the opinion was highly deferential
to state statutory determinations of dangerous expression. Such
determinations "must be given great weight. Every presumption
is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute .. .,22
Only patently unreasonable laws or laws unreasonably applied'
3
could be set aside as violations of due process.
Brandeis's concurrence, joined by Justice Holmes, rejected the
"bad tendency" test in favor of the "clear and present danger"
standard. Brandeis perceived Sanford's constitutional analysis as
devoid of any meaningful First Amendment restraints: "I am un-
able to assent to the suggestion in the opinion of the court that
assembling with a political party, formed to advocate the desira-
118 Smolla at 106 (cited in note 12).
"
9 274 US 357 (1927)
20 See note 66.
12274 US at 361.
122 Id at 371.
"23 In the same term as the Whitney decision was rendered, a unanimous opinion (per
Justice Sanford) set aside a criminal syndicalism conviction on the grounds that the law
as applied violated due process. Fiske v Kansas, 274 US 380 (1927). The conviction of
Harold B. Fiske, an IWW organizer, was reversed because it was obtained "without any
charge or evidence that the organization in which he secured members advocated any
crime, violence or other unlawful acts or methods as a means of effecting industrial or
political changes or revolution." Id at 387.
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bility of a proletariat revolution by mass action at some date nec-
essarily far in the future, is not a right within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment." '124 On the procedural side of the
ledger, Brandeis rejected the majority's assumption of jurisdiction.
"Our power of review in this case is limited . . . to the particular
claims duly made below, and denied.' 2' Finding no clear and
present danger issue raised by Whitney's counsel in the state court
proceedings, Brandeis added: "We lack here the power occasion-
ally exercised on review of judgments of lower federal courts to
correct in criminal cases vital errors, although the objection was
not taken in the trial court. . . . Because we may not inquire into
the errors now alleged, I concur in affirming the judgment of the
state court.'
1 26
Substantively, the similarities and differences between Bran-
deis's opinions in Ruthenberg and Whitney are notable. Taken to-
gether, they provide a fuller view of Brandeis's ideas-both as
conceptualized and applied-than has heretofore been known.
Brandeis's Ruthenberg opinion lacks some of the polish that made
his Whitney concurrence so remarkable. Understandably, Ruth-
enberg does not contain at least one memorable passage found in
Whitney: "Men feared witches and burnt women."' 27 And Ruth-
enberg is not as comprehensive in its formulation of the clear and
present danger test. What Whitney lacks, in contrast, is precisely
what Ruthenberg proffers: an extended and forceful application of
Brandeis's approach to the facts of the case.
Given Brandeis's jurisdictional concerns in Whitney, he did not
examine the application of his test to the facts. As Brandeis ex-
plained in Whitney:
Whether in 1919, when Miss Whitney did the things com-
plained of, there was in California such clear and present danger
of serious evil, might have been made the important issue in
the case. She might have required that the issue be determined
either by the court or the jury. She claimed below that the
statute as applied to her violated the federal Constitution; but
she did not claim that it was void because there was no clear
and present danger of serious evil, nor did she request that the
24 274 US at 379 (Brandeis concurring).
, Id at 380 (Brandeis concurring).
126 Id.
27 Id at 375.
[2005
CURIOUS CONCURRENCE 375
existence of these conditions of a valid measure thus restricting
the rights of free speech and assembly be passed upon by the
court or a jury. On the other hand, there was evidence on which
the court or jury might have found that such danger existed.'28
Among possible reasons for such failures of proof, two stand out
as most likely. First, Whitney's trial lawyers focused on her per-
sonal innocence rather than on the criminal culpability of the
group. In contrast, Ruthenberg's lawyers built a strong record
concerning the legal character of the Communist Party of Amer-
ica. Second, since the First Amendment had not at the time of
the trial been applied to the states, Whitney's counsel may not
have believed it necessary to request a clear and present danger
jury instruction. Ruthenberg's attorneys, however, requested
(though were denied) a clear and present danger jury instruction.
Hence, the jurisdictional problems that plagued Whitney were ab-
sent in Ruthenberg's case.'29
One other difference between what Brandeis wrote in Ruthen-
berg and Whitney is worth some reflection; it concerns the question
of the burden of proof in criminal syndicalism cases argued after
Schenck v United States.30 Specifically, which side (the prosecution
or the defense) bears the burden of making such a showing of
"clear and present danger" to the trier of fact? In Ruthenberg,
Brandeis seemed to be saying that such a burden rested with the
state: "The jury [was] not instructed that there must be clear and
present danger of immediate violence to justify conviction." In
Whitney, Brandeis appears to point in the other direction: "The
legislative declaration" of the California syndicalism statute creates
"a rebuttable presumption" that the clear and present danger "con-
ditions have been satisfied." By that measure, the state need not
25 Id at 379.
29An interesting (and professionally important) question is whether a court (and spe-
cifically a Justice such as Brandeis) should hold counsel to an obligation to make legal
arguments that prior opinions have not encouraged or have rejected-for instance, that
the First Amendment (via the Fourteenth Amendment) should bind the States exactly as
it does Congress-or rather should understand an invocation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment generously to encompass whatever the court is prepared to make of it. This point
is discussed more fully in Part III.
130 249 US 47 (1919). Rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a conviction under the
Espionage Act of 1917, Justice Holmes's opinion of the Court in Schenck reasoned: "The
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree." Id at 52.
376 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
offer such proof as part of its case in chief. Rather, it would be
incumbent on the defense to rebut the presumption of danger.
Since Whitney's lawyers had neither offered rebutting evidence
nor sought a jury instruction challenging the legislative presump-
tion, the Supreme Court (Brandeis insisted) was unable to take
the matter up de novo in a state case.
Had Ruthenberg lived, the Whitney concurrence would have
been far more modest. It would have been a short and technical
opinion, and devoid of the luster that made it famous. In other
words, it would have been lost to history.
D. THE PHOENIX RISES
Eugene Debs predicted in 1925 that "Anita Whitney will not
go to prison. ' By 1927, after the Supreme Court's affirmance
of her conviction, that prediction seemed fanciful. But a few days
before the Court granted a rehearing in Whitney v California,
something unusual happened. It was something that caught the
attention of Anita Whitney's lead appellate counsel, Walter Pollak.
One of Pollak's former clients, Benjamin Gitlow, who six months
earlier had lost his First Amendment case in the Supreme Court,
was pardoned by the governor of New York.
13 2
Shortly thereafter, in June 192 7, California Governor Clement
Calhoun Young pardoned Whitney,'3 3 an act of clemency that sur-
prised many. Few governors, let alone a Republican governor like
Young, ever pardoned a "Red" at a time when Communists were
so demonized. So, why was Anita Whitney pardoned? The answer
is every bit as curious as almost everything else in her case.
The pardon application and much of the campaign were spear-
headed by Whitney's former California appellate lawyer, John
Francis Neylan. The Hearst lawyer who looked out for the in-
terests of management,'34 Neylan was a man of power. From his
plush suite at the Palace Hotel, he developed legal arguments to
31 Quoted in Richmond at 137 (cited in note 17).
32 The facts in this paragraph are substantiated in Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652
(1925); Gitlow Is Pardoned by Governor Smith as Punished Enough, New York Times (Dec
12, 1925), p 1; Gitlow, Set Free, Rejoins Radicals, New York Times (Dec 13, 1925), p 18.
133 Miss Whitney Granted Pardon in California, Washington Post (June 21, 1927), p 1 (AP
story).
' See John Francis Neylan, 74, Dies in San Francisco, Washington Post (Aug 22, 1960).
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save the liberty of a client whose political creed was antithetical
to his professional existence.
He also recruited others to his cause. The list of those who
endorsed a pardon for Whitney was a Who's Who of captains of
commerce. Politicians also stepped forward to advance the pardon
campaign. "Were I Governor, I would pardon her at once," de-
clared U.S. Senator Hiram Johnson (R-CA). University professors,
social workers, economists, and civic and religious leaders followed
suit. Even Walter J. Peterson, who had been in charge of the detail
that arrested Whitney, said that her arrest was a mistake:
I investigated Anita Whitney's record in 1919 . . . . I found
that she had always done an enormous amount of good in the
community. ... She was one of those idealists who want to
make the world better for everyone. I ordered Fenton Thomp-
son not to arrest her. But he was so zealous he went over my
head to Commissioner J. F Morse and the arrest was made.
No constructive good can be done by making a martyr of Anita
Whitney. She should never have been held to answer in the
first place. 3
The beneficiary of the pardon, however, resisted these efforts.
"I have done nothing to be pardoned for," she told a reporter for
the Oakland Tribune in May of 192 7. "I have no intention of asking
for a pardon." And then, in allegiance to her ideological comrades,
she declared: "I have nothing to complain of in comparison with
Sacco and Vanzetti."' 36 The editors of the Los Angeles Times were
so taken aback by her response that they remarked: "If Anita Whit-
ney will not sign her own petition for leniency, there isn't much
reason why anyone else should." '137
While this campaign was building momentum, Ms. Whitney
was still out on bail on her $10,000 bond. She probably would
have been rearrested and ordered to start her prison time at San
Quentin had it not been for the hesitancy of the Alameda District
Attorney, Earl Warren.'38
1sRichmond at 139 (cited in note 17).
136 All of the newspaper references come from or are quoted in Miss Whitney Won't Ask
Pardon, New York Times (May 17, 1927), p 31.
137 Has an Interest, Los Angeles Times (June 21, 1927), sec A, p 4.
"' See Miss Whitney Won't Ask Pardon, New York Times (May 17, 1927), p 31.
378 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
On June 20, 1927, Governor Young pardoned Anita Whitney.
His reasons for issuing the pardon:
• "Because I do not believe under ordinary circumstances this
case would have ever been brought to trial."
" "Because the abnormal conditions attending the trial go a long
way toward explaining the verdict of the jury."
• "Because I feel that the criminal syndicalism act was primarily
intended to apply to organizations actually known as advocates
of violence, terrorism, or sabotage, rather than to such or-
ganizations as the Communist Labor Party," and
• "Because the judges who have been connected with the case
as well as the authors and some of the strongest advocates of
the law under which Miss Whitney was convicted unite in
urging that a pardon be granted." '139
The pardon apparently won the approval of Louis Brandeis.
Shortly after it was issued, the Justice wrote to his friend, Harvard
Law Professor Felix Frankfurter: "The pardon of Anita Whitney
was a fine job."'4 ° A few weeks later, Whitney celebrated her six-
tieth birthday. She was now a free woman, thanks largely to con-
servative capitalists.'
41
In her last years, Anita Whitney remained true to her stripes.
She still passed out leaflets at factory gates, picketed at the German
Consulate, and took to a "soapbox in Dolores Park to talk about
the Japanese internment.' 1 42 Even at eighty-three, when she was
frail, she allowed longshoremen to carry her to a political rally
where she spoke in defense of her fellow activists in the labor
movement. In February of 1955, she died at her home in San
Francisco, 143 having lived just long enough to hear the news about
' Quoted in Miss Whitney Granted Pardon in California at 1 (cited in note 133).
141 Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy, "Half Brother Half Son": The Letters of Lonis
D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfitrter 293 (Oklahoma, 1991) (letter dated June 26, 1927).
"' Richmond at 140 (cited in note 17).
42 Rubens at 169 (cited in note 17).
143 See S.F Woman Supporter of Reds Dies, Los Angeles Times (Feb 5, 1955), p 2; Anita
Whitney, Old-Time Communist Dies at 87, Washington Post (Feb 6, 1955), see A, p 14.
Her private papers appear to have been destroyed by an unsympathetic relative. See Rubens
at 167 (cited in note 17).
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the Court's landmark ruling in Brown v Board of Education.'44
Whereas Charles Ruthenberg's death had robbed him of a lasting
name in the law, it made Whitney's name memorable. And whereas
the Court had not given Whitney her liberty, it gave her a legacy.
III. BRANDEIS'S VOTE AGAINST WHITNEY: PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE FAULTS
Justice Brandeis voted for Charles Ruthenberg on both pro-
cedural and substantive grounds, and voted against Anita Whitney
on both procedural and substantive grounds. We find it difficult
to accept such different outcomes.
The final two paragraphs of Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney
usually have been ignored. They stated, in full:
Whether in 1919, when Miss Whitney did the things com-
plained of, there was in California such clear and present danger
of serious evil, might have been made the important issue in
the case. She might have required that the issue be determined either
by the court or the jury. She claimed below that the statute as
applied to her violated the Federal Constitution; but she did not
claim that it was void because there was no clear and present danger
of serious evil, nor did she request that the existence of these conditions
of a valid measure thus restricting the rights of free speech and
assembly be passed upon by the court or a jury. On the other hand,
there was evidence on which the court or jury might have found that
such danger existed. I am unable to assent to the suggestion in
the opinion of the Court that assembling with a political party,
formed to advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution
by mass action at some date necessarily far in the future, is not
a right within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the present case, however, there was other testimony which tended
to establish the existence of a conspiracy, on the part of members of
the International Workers of the World, to commit present serious
crimes; and likewise to show that such a conspiray would be furthered
by the activity of the society of which Miss Whitney was a member.
Under these circumstances the judgment of the state court cannot be
disturbed.
Our power of review in this case is limited not only to the
question whether a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitu-
tion was denied, Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590; Haire
v. Rice, 204 U.S. 291, 301; but to the particular claims duly
made below, and denied. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Duvall, 225
144 347 US 483 (1954).
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U.S. 477, 485-488. We lack here the power occasionally ex-
ercised on review of judgments of lower federal courts to correct
in criminal cases vital errors, although the objection was not
taken in the trial court. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632,
658-660; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 221-222. This
is a writ of error to a state court. Because we may not enquire
into the errors now alleged, I concur in affirming the judgment of
the state court.14
At the outset, note that Brandeis offers two kinds of arguments
as to why he votes to affirm Whitney's conviction-jurisdictional
and substantive. Generally speaking, this two-track line of argu-
ment suggests that even if one were to grant arguendo that there
were no jurisdictional impediments, Brandeis was nonetheless pre-
pared to vote against Whitney on the substantive merits. On both
tracks, we think Brandeis had it wrong, and we surmise that he
may well have known it.
A. JURISDICTION
Louis Brandeis's noted biographer, Alpheus Thomas Mason,
echoed the Whitney concurrence when he wrote: "Miss Whitney
had not, as she might have done, raised the question whether there
was in fact a 'clear and present danger' manifest in her acts. 146
That echo has reverberated down the halls of academe for almost
eight decades; it is the conventional wisdom. That "wisdom," how-
ever, both assumes too much and understands too little. For the
matter is much more complicated. Brandeis was right to flag ju-
risdictional problems, but wrong in the way he resolved them.
From the beginning, Whitney was not a case that Brandeis
wanted to hear. Recall that the Court first had denied jurisdiction
over the appeal, and granted a rehearing only after Whitney's
counsel maintained that the California court's certificate estab-
lished jurisdiction. Even then, Brandeis might have been disin-
clined to hear the case, as revealed in his astute clerk's thirteen-
page typed memorandum. Had Brandeis's brethren paid allegiance
to the law tendered in James Landis's memo, Whitney could not
have remained on the Court's docket.
According to that memo, there was no basis for finding a federal
' 274 US at 379-80 (Brandeis concurring) (emphasis added).
46 Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's Life 565 (Viking, 1946).
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question in the Whitney trial and appellate court record. Among
the reasons presented, the following were most significant:147
No federal claim raised at trial: Examining the trial record,
only a demurrer to the information remotely suggested a con-
stitutional claim. The demurrer asserted generally "that the facts
stated do not constitute a public offense, for the reason that the
purported statute therein referred to is void, invalid, and un-
constitutional." Citing six Supreme Court rulings, Landis em-
phasized "the doctrine that a mere assertion of unconstitution-
ality and invalidity will be taken to have had reference to the
state and not the federal constitution."
No federal claim raised by the certificate: Landis found the cer-
tificate suspect: "[T]he certificate in this case is really a stipu-
lation by counsel approved by the court (not signed by any
member of the court). Its effect is thus considerably weaker than
the usual type of certificate signed by the presiding justice of
the state court." Moreover, the certificate alone was "incom-
petent to originate [a federal] question." The only value of a
certificate was to make more specific the federal claim that was
already in the record.'48
No federal question necessarily decided by the state court: Landis
acknowledged that Supreme Court jurisdiction would lie if a
state court actually decided a federal question but attempted to
conceal its decision by failing to mention the federal claim in
its opinion. Regarding the existing state of First Amendment
law, however, Landis concluded: "[T]here must be something
in the record (including the opinion) that the state court was
led to suppose that the plaintiff in error claimed protection
' The references to James Landis's memorandum, the synthesis of the arguments
therein, and the supporting quotations are drawn from James M. Landis, In re #10-
Existence of a Federal Question in the Record (undated memorandum to Justice Brandeis
regarding jurisdictional hurdles in Whitney v California), in The Louis Brandeis Papers: Part
I, 1916-1931 (Harvard Legal Manuscripts, Harvard Law School Library), microfilm reel
34, frames 00325-00337.
"' Notably, Landis took pains to distance Whitney from another case argued by Walter
Nelles and Walter Pollack, Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652 (1925), in which a certificate
from the New York Court of Appeals had been used to establish the existence of a federal
question for Supreme Court jurisdiction. The Gitlow case was readily distinguished on
the grounds that the federal First and Fourteenth Amendment claim had been specifically
raised in and ruled upon by the New York trial and appellate courts. See Kurland and
Casper at 521-531 (cited in note 72).
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under some specific clause of the constitution. In view of the
fact that the claim for protection in this case . . . is by no means
fully and specifically developed by the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, it would seem to be highly erroneous
to assume that the state court . . . necessarily decided that the
statute was not in conflict with the federal constitution."
Thus, Landis (who would later serve as dean of the Harvard Law
School) submitted that Whitney's writ of error should be dis-
missed. Surprisingly, Brandeis dismissed the sound advice of his
law clerk, and signed onto the majority's dubious grant of juris-
diction to reach the federal First Amendment claim.
Instead, Brandeis faults Whitney's counsel for failing to raise a
clear and present danger claim at her state court trial. But could
that fault be fairly charged? At the time of Whitney's trial, neither
the First Amendment nor the Supreme Court's "clear and present
danger" test had been applied to the states. Whitney's trial took
place in early 1920. But as late as 1922, the Court insisted that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision of
the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the states any
restrictions about 'freedom of speech.""' .4 9 Dicta to the contrary
did not come until June of 1925 in Gitlow v New York. 5' The
holding of Stromberg v California5' explicitly applying the First
Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment did
not come until May of 1931, and the First Amendment right of
assembly that was at the core of the Wbitney case was not imposed
on the states until 1937. 151
"49 Prudential Insurance Company of America v Cheek, 259 US 530, 543 (1922).
I50 268 US 652, 666 (1925).
.51 283 US 359, 368-69 (1931) (striking down on First and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds a California statute criminalizing the display of a red flag as a statement of
"opposition to organized government"). In Fiske v Kansas, 274 US 380 (1927) (a unanimous
decision filed on the same day as Whitney), the Court set aside a Kansas syndicalism
conviction of an IWTW organizer because the State's indictment and prosecution failed to
introduce any real evidence of the group's unlawful purposes. As applied, the law was "an
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power of the state, unwarrantably in-
fringing the liberty of the defendant." Id at 387. Fiske has been understood by some
distinguished First Amendment scholars to be the first case to uphold a defendant's claim
to protection of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Emerson at 103 (cited in note 11). See
also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States 352 (Harvard, 1941). Professor
Chafee does observe, however, that "[i]t might be assumed that the court did nothing
more than declare that a man cannot be convicted for a crime which is neither charged
nor proved." Indeed, this narrower construction of Fiske strikes us as the more accurate
one.
152 DeJonge v Oregon, 299 US 353 (1937).
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Given the state of the law, the "clear and present danger" test
was not likely to be invoked by Whitney's defense counsel, and
the California courts would not likely have granted a request for
such an instruction." 3 Thus, Brandeis's declaration that Anita
Whitney "might have required that [the First Amendment's "clear
and present danger"] issue be determined either by the court or
the jury" asked too much of trial counsel."5 4
So, why did he do it? Charles Ruthenberg's death on March 2,
1927, must have frustrated Brandeis. The formidable dissent that
he had drafted for Ruthenberg stood to be lost to history. The
solution might have seemed obvious: adapt the Ruthenberg dissent
to the facts in Whitney. But Landis's memorandum powerfully
argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction in Whitney. Recall that
Brandeis originally had prepared a two-paragraph opinion dis-
pensing with Whitney's appeal for procedural reasons. If he con-
tinued down that course after Ruthenberg's death, there would
then have been no reason for him to reach the First Amendment.
When the Whitney majority leaped over the federal jurisdictional
hurdles to reach the merits of the case' (and reinvigorate the
153 The fact that Ruthenberg's trial and appellate attorneys explicitly raised federal con-
stitutional speech and assembly claims and requested trial court instructions on those
issues, which were predictably refused, in no way undercuts our point. After all, Ruthenberg
and his counsel had faced scores of criminal indictments, and were extremely familiar with
all the procedural and substantive gambits that might conceivably be used in his defense.
In that respect, their particularized expertise far exceeded that of Whitney's state trial and
appellate counsel.
"' Strictly speaking, Brandeis appears misleading when he suggested that Anita Whitney
should have raised a First Amendment clear and present danger defense, for that consti-
tutional reference masked an analogous statutory burden that Whitney's counsel did not
satisfy. Brandeis's concurrence presented the California legislature's explanation of the
contemporary conditions threatening public order and justifying the enactment of an
emergency measure. He read the California statute as creating a presumption of public
harm arising from syndicalist activities-a presumption that could be rebutted by the
defendant with sufficient evidence that no such imminent danger existed. Essentially, the
statutory burden and the constitutional one mirrored each other; in all likelihood, a de-
fendant who rebutted the statutory presumption would have made an argument quite
similar to a First Amendment clear and present danger defense. But the two are different
in this important respect: if Anita Whitney had prevailed on statutory grounds, a court
would not thereafter entertain any constitutional challenge to the same effect. See, e.g.,
Siler v Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 US 175 (1909). By the same logic, if Whitney
failed to raise a state statutory defense, she could not thereafter assert a federal First
Amendment claim. This is but another reason why Brandeis ought to have restrained
himself from waxing long on the First Amendment.
5 "Sanford did not explain why the justices bent their rules in this case; most likely,
the conservative majority wanted to warn political radicals that not only could publishing
calls for revolution be punished-as Gitlow had ruled-but that simply joining a 'revo-
lutionary' group could lead to prison." Peter Irons, A People's History of the Supreme Court
290 (Penguin, 1999).
384 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
"bad tendency" test'56), Brandeis felt obligated to counter both
their jurisdictional and substantive arguments. The result was his
curious concurrence in Whitney.
B. SUBSTANCE
The links between Miss Whitney, the mild-mannered political
reformist, and the hot-headed 1WW radicals were so tenuous as
to be farcical. But Brandeis chose to lend his name to that farce.
Consider the following passage from his concurrence: "there was
other testimony which tended to establish the existence of a con-
spiracy, on the part of members of the International Workers of
the World, to commit present serious crimes, and likewise to show
that such a conspiracy would be furthered by the activity of the
society of which Miss Whitney was a member." In other words,
there was evidence in the record that might establish: (1) that some
extremists in the IWW conspired to commit immediate and dan-
gerous illegal acts; (2) that the Communist Labor Party of America
"furthered" that conspiracy by recognizing in its National Pro-
gram the "long and valiant struggle and heroic sacrifices" of the
IWW; (3) that the Communist Labor Party of California addi-
tionally "furthered" that conspiracy by adopting the National Pro-
gram of the Communist Labor Party of America; and (4) that
Anita Whitney could be prosecuted for her otherwise lawful mem-
bership and innocent participation in the Communist Labor Party
of California.'57
Under that application of the California statute, the "evils" of
the 1VWW are imputed to Anita Whitney in such a way that its
criminal acts stain her. She is sullied by her mere assembly with
the CLPC, regardless of her own intent in assembling and re-
gardless of whether or not that assembly meaningfully furthers
the conspiratorial schemes of the IWW. This theory of culpability
posits, with Brandeis's approval, that if the IWW's activities pro-
duce an imminent danger of serious violence, then responsibility
'
6 See Rabban at 17-18, 118-19, 132-34, 193-200, 256-58, 282-85, 291-92, 320-26
(cited in note 9).
' Remember that, under the California statute, her criminal culpability was completed
by her membership in the CLPC, her presence at its organizing convention and involve-
ment in its committees, her grudging acceptance of the CLPC's rejection of her reformist
"political action" resolution, her continued active attendance at the organizing convention,
and of course her willingness to entertain silly radical songs.
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for that danger "flows" to Whitney. Such logic removes any sem-
blance of actual causation from the constitutional equation. That
Brandeis understood this problem is evidenced by his Ruthenberg
dissent, where he wrote that there must be a "proximate relation
of cause to consequence of which alone the law commonly takes
account." That language did not find its way, however, into his
Whitney concurrence. To the extent that Brandeis abandoned that
concept in Whitney, his heroic First Amendment formulation col-
lapses into a variation of the majority's "bad tendency" test.
Indeed, the Justice's own law clerk, James Landis, cautioned
Brandeis about this problem. In his October 27, 1926 memoran-
dum on the Whitney case, Landis incisively observed:
[It may be argued that we have a situation where [the TWW's]
industrial crimes were likely to occur whether the Communist
Labor Party of California existed or not; [but] that the danger
of such crimes was substantially increased by (a) the existence
of a group like the CLP which, while it did not advocate sab-
otage, yet justified violation of law as a remedy for the ills of
the proletariat, the same ills, to a certain extent, which disturbed
the IWW, or by (b) expression of approval given by the CLP,
or (c) by both together. The argument of course assumes that
the evil tendency of the speech or assembly is enough to remove
it from the protection of the fourteenth amendment. . . . But
in any case where there is no direct incitement, it is very dan-
gerous to allow a limitation on the right of free speech or
assembly to be based on an evil tendency, whether to create a
danger or to increase an existing danger. Many innocent activ-
ities, certainly protected by free speech, might be condemned
under such a rule. . . . Hence we ought to require at least a
clear demonstration of the effect or tendency of the acts pun-
ished in increasing the danger.
Landis went on to apply his understanding of the "imminent in-
citement" test to the Whitney facts:
Such a demonstration doesn't exist here. .... (i) The reference
in the National Program of the CLP of America to the IWW
is nothing more than a statement of approval; a pledge of
"whole-hearted support" in a political platform may be disre-
garded. The statement is in very general terms, it may or may
not be understood to refer to the criminal activities of the IWW,
[and it] was not communicated directly to the people whom it
is here argued it will influence. . . . Hence it is very doubtful
whether the Cal. Party's statement of approval. . . would carry
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a dynamic quality such as would lead to action on the strength
of it. (ii) I find more plausible the idea that the very existence
of the CLP of Cal., a group with similar ultimate aims and an
ethic which excuses law-violation, would lend encouragement
to these active syndicalists. The suggestion may indicate the
danger of the whole theory which would uphold the statute.' 8
What, then, was Justice Brandeis thinking? One is left to wonder
why he proceeded beyond the jurisdictional analysis to the sub-
stantive discussion that could prove so problematic.
IV. HISTORY IN THE MAKING
Having much, of course, makes one want more, and this appears
true for Brandeis scholarship as well. (Melvin I. Urofsky)'59
However Brandeis voted in Whitney, the final result in the
case would have been the same. And while a vote in her favor
might have made the pardon campaign on her behalf easier, it
proved unnecessary. So why is it important which way Brandeis
voted as long as he wrote what he did?
It is a truism, but one worth repeating nonetheless: context gives
words their fullest meaning. Context puts flesh on skeletal words.
The idea was not foreign to Brandeis; it is a leaf out of his book:
"No law, written or unwritten, can be understood without a full
knowledge of the facts out of which it arises and to which it is to
be applied."' 60 The same, of course, holds true for Brandeis161 and
"sMemorandum on Whitney v California, October 27, 1926, pp 5-6, in The Louis Brandeis
Papers: Part 1, 1916-1931 (Harvard Legal Manuscripts, Harvard Law School Library),
microfilm reel 34, frames 00307-00312. This memorandum was unsigned. Based on our
understanding of the record of correspondence between Brandeis and his clerks at the
time, we assume that James Landis authored it; if it were not Landis, then it would have
been Robert Page.
'Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis Agenda, in Nelson L. Dawson, ed, Brandeis and
America 132, 147 (Kentucky, 1989).
'6 Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 Ill L Rev 461, 467 (1916).
161 Professor Urofsky makes a telling point:
I keep coming back to the man, to his life and work. On several occasions
I thought I had finished, and each time I would run across something new, a
letter or an opinion or a source I had not seen before, and suddenly there would
be a new idea, a new appreciation of what he stood for. I am not done exploring
Brandeis, but it is a vast territory, and those of us working it there welcome
company.
Urofsky at 148-49 (cited in note 159).
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what he wrote in Whitney.
While others have written thoughtfully on the meaning of the
words of Brandeis's great concurrence,162 they have done so with
too little historical backdrop. We have attempted to provide a
measure of context heretofore missing, or missing in the sense
that much of the available historical information had not been
collected in a single place.
We came to this juncture by asking: "Why did Brandeis concur
in Whitney?" That question led us back not only to the life and
times of Charlotte Anita Whitney, but also to those of Charles
Ruthenberg. At the end of this inquiry, some may sense that we
have done little more than return to the place from whence we
began, namely, that Brandeis concurred in Whitney for jurisdic-
tional reasons. Even if that were true, it does not discount the
importance of a fuller and more informed understanding of why
Brandeis did what he did.
As rhetorically rich and intellectually astute as Brandeis's con-
currence was, we submit that it might have been better still had
he applied those insights to the facts of Whitney, much as he had
done in his Ruthenberg dissent. In light of his jurisdictional con-
cerns, he might have voted to remand the case for further pro-
ceedings.
Be that as it may, it is enough, for our purposes anyway, that
the story of Brandeis's concurrence has been told more fully than
ever before. And what an amazing story it is in the history of free
speech in America.
"2 See, e.g., Blasi (cite in note 4); Robert M. Cover, The Left, the Right, and the First
Amendment, 40 Md L Rev 349 (1981).
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APPENDIX A'
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 44 - October Term, 1926
Charles E. Ruthenberg, In Error to the Supreme Court
Plaintiff in Error of the State of Michigan.
Vs.
The People of the State of
Michigan.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting.
Ruthenberg was tried, convicted and sentenced for the crime of voluntary
assembling with the Communist Party of America, a society "formed to
teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism" - and for that
crime only. This new felony of voluntarily assembling is very unlike the
ancient misdemeanor of unlawful assembly. Its criminal quality does not
arise from immediate danger of breach of the peace incident to a gath-
ering at a particular time and place under particular circumstances. It
inheres, as the statute is construed by the Supreme Court of Michigan,
in every gathering of a society, formed to advocate the obnoxious doctrine
of criminal syndicalism. 229 Mich. 315. The mere act of assembling is
given the dynamic quality of crime. The accused is to be punished, not
for violence or threat of violence, not for attempt, incitement or con-
spiracy, but for a step in preparation which, if it threatens the public
order at all, does so only remotely. There is guilt, although there was
no present act of promulgation of syndicalism. What the society had
done before the accused attended the meeting and what the assemblage
did later, are of no significance except as evidence to establish the purpose
of the meeting and his election to join it. The felony is complete at the
moment the accused becomes part of the particular assemblage, whatever
the time, place or circumstance, however remote the danger appre-
I Q Harvard University Law School Library. This unpublished draft opinion is located
in The Louis Brandeis Papers: Part I, 1916-1931 (Harvard Legal Manuscripts, Harvard Law
School Library), microfilm reel 34, frames 00351-00360, and is reproduced with per-
mission of the Harvard Law School Library. It was not contained in Alexander M. Bickel,
The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis (Harvard University Press, 1957) or else-
where. This draft was dated October 1, 1926, and appears to be the last complete version
that was sent to the printer. Apparently, at some subsequent but unspecified date, Justice
Brandeis penned modifications in the margins of the October 1"t draft, but the changed
draft was never printed, possibly because of the dismissal of Ruthenberg's case. See The
Louis Brandeis Papers: Part I, 1916-1931 (Harvard Legal Manuscripts, Harvard Law School
Library), microfilm reel 34, frames 00361-00362, 00365-00369. In any event, based on
the information available to us, it is impossible for us to know whether or not Justice
Brandeis would finally have adopted those modifications or any others. The bold and
bracketed numbers in the text refer to the original printed page numbers in the dissent.
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hended, and however improbable that serious evil will eventually befall.
Is the statute so construed and as here applied consistent with the due
process clause?
[2] The right to liberty obviously does not prevent a State from taking
action reasonably required to protect itself from destruction or serious
political, economic or moral injury. To this end, it may, in the exercise
of its police power, ordinarily adopt any measure which the governing
majority deems necessary and appropriate. But, despite arguments to the
contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it has been settled that the
State's power, so far as its exercise involves fundamental rights of the
citizen, is restricted by the due process clause in matters of substantive
law as well as in procedural law. Whether a particular measure is rea-
sonable and appropriate, may therefore present a justiciable federal ques-
tion. In this case, the matters requiring consideration are whether the
right to peaceful assembly is one of the fundamental rights; if so, what
its limits are; and whether these have been invaded by the statute as
construed and applied. As to the first of these enquiries, there seems
little room for doubt. The right of assembly partakes of the nature of
the rights to free speech, to a free press, and to teach - the fundamental
rights with which it is closely associated. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510. The protection extended by the Constitution to the right of assem-
bly must, therefore, be as broad as that enjoyed by these other funda-
mental rights. Like them, it may be restricted only if, and to the extent
that its exercise involves clear and present danger.
The novelty in the prohibition introduced is that the statute aims not
directly at the practice of criminal syndicalism, but at the preaching of
it. The practice of "sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" had
already been made a crime. So had conspiracy, and incitement to others,
to use such means. But no attempt was made to prove any such overt
act in Michigan, or elsewhere in the United States, nor to show danger
of breach of the peace at the assemblage. The convention was held in a
remote and secluded spot supposed to be known only to a few trusted
delegates who attended it. There was not even danger that the obnoxious
doctrine would be taught at the convention. All the delegates were fa-
miliar with it.
[3] Since the attack made upon the statute as construed and applied,
our decision of this question must depend upon the specific facts. Dahnke-
Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282. But, before these can be
examined profitably, it is necessary to determine generally, when a danger
shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and still be deemed
present; and what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently substantial
to justify resort to abridgement of free speech and assembly as the means
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of protection. To reach sound conclusions on these matters, we must
bear in mind why a State is, ordinarily, denied the power to prohibit
dissemination of social, economic and political doctrines which a vast
majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil conse-
quences; in other words, why free speech and assembly were made con-
stitutional rights. We must bear in mind, also, the wide difference legally
between assembling and conspiracy, between advocacy and incitement,
between preparation and attempt.
In a democracy public discussion is a political duty. This principle lies
at the foundation of the American system of government. Freedom to
think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth. Without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile. With them, discussion affords or-
dinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of the noxious
doctrine. Those who won our independence by revolution valued liberty
both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret
of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They recognized
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that the greatest
menace to stable government is repression; and that the fitting remedy
for evil counsels good ideas. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law - the
argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies
of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution as to guarantee
free speech and assembly.
To self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of reason applied
through the process of popular government, no danger flowing from
speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall [4] before there is op-
portunity for full discussion. Only an emergency can justify repression.
Mere bad tendency of the utterance cannot. If authority is to be rec-
onciled with freedom this rule must prevail.' Moreover, even imminent
danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of functions essential to ef-
fective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Pro-
' Compare Z. Chafee, Jr., 'Freedom of Speech,' pp. 24-39, 207-221, 228, 262-265; H.
J. Laski, 'Grammar of Politics,' pp. 120, 121. See Thomas Jefferson: "If there be any
among us who wish to dissolve the union or change its republican form, let them stand
undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated
where reason is left free to combat it." First Inaugural Address. Also: "We have nothing
to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if others are left free to demonstrate
their errors and especially when the law stands ready to punish the first criminal act
produced by the false reasonings; these are safer corrections than the conscience of the
judge." Quoted by Charles A. Beard, The Nation, July 7, 1926, Vol. 123, P. 8. And Lord
Justice Scrutton in Rex v. Secretary for Home Affairs, Ex parte O'Brien, (1923) 2 K. B.
361, 382: "You really believe in freedom of speech, if you are willing to allow it to men
whose opinions seem to you wrong and even dangerous; . . . " Compare Warren, "The
New Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 39 Harvard Law Review, 431, 461.
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hibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it
would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm
to society. A police measure may be unconstitutional merely because it
is an inappropriate means of protection. Thus, a State might, in the
exercise of its police power, make any trespass upon the land of another
a crime, regardless of the results or of the intent or purpose of the
trespasser. It might, also, punish an attempt, a conspiracy, or an incite-
ment to commit the trespass. But it is hardly conceivable that this Court
would hold constitutional a statute which punished as a felony the mere
voluntary assembly with a society formed to teach that pedestrians had
the moral right to cross unenclosed, unposted, waste lands and to ad-
vocate their doing so, even if there was imminent danger that advocacy
would lead to a trespass.
In the case at bar, the evil feared was obviously not a trivial one. But
the question for decision is whether there was reasonable ground for
fear. No such ground existed, unless there was in 1922 imminent danger
that some evil might result from Ruthenberg's assembling with the Com-
munist Party of America, and unless the [5] evil which might reasonably
be apprehended was one sufficiently serious to make denial of free speech
and assembly an appropriate remedy. These matters require consider-
ation not only of the doctrine to be advanced, but also of the circum-
stances under which it was to be preached.
The Program and other documents introduced at the trial establish
that the doctrine to be taught and advocated by the Communist Party
of America was "criminal syndicalism." The Party teaches that workers
are now exploited and oppressed; that the interests of capital and labor
are irreconcilable; that the low condition of labor results from the fact
that existing government, municipal, state and national, constitutes gov-
ernment by and for the capitalist class; that the class struggle is inevitable;
and that to secure adequate relief, the class struggle must take the form
of political struggle - a struggle for the control of government. The
Party declares that the ultimate goal is destruction of existing government
and substitution of a proletarian dictatorship; that, as the workers are
dependent for life, liberty and happiness upon the ownership and control
of the raw materials and machinery of production, this dictatorship will
take these from capitalists; that it will establishment ownership; that with
such ownership it will develop management of the industries by the
workers; and that it will, in time, include as workers the whole adult
population.
There is no suggestion of sabotage. In fact, the Party rejects as absurd
the theory that the revolution can be accomplished by the direct seizure
of industry without first overthrowing the capitalist state. The teaching
is that American Democracy is a fraud, that not merely the practice, but
the form of our government makes it the effective instrument of capitalist
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control; that effective control by the workers can be secured only through
destroying the existing government and substituting therefore the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat, in the form of workers' councils or Soviets;
that this indispensable revolutionary change can be achieved through the
mass power of the exploited class, provided its members are united in
unshakable loyalty to the principles and leaders of the Party; but that
the capture of political power cannot be effected by the ballot alone;
that to overthrow capitalist government, resort must eventually be had
to the same kind of armed force which [6] is now used by the ruling
class to keep the working class in subjection; and that in the transition
period from Capitalism to Communism force must and will be used to
establish and to maintain the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The predicted use of force in the final struggle by which the communist
state is to be substituted in America for the capitalistic was in 1922 a
remote contingency. The Party had then less than six thousand members,
scattered throughout the United States. Of these, all but five thousand
were foreign born - persons apparently of small means and unfamiliar
with the English language. The aggregate of a year's expenditures for
all its activities was $185,715. Even if all the resources, intellectual and
financial, of the Russian Soviet Republic were to be devoted to propa-
ganda here, the process of converting any substantial portion of the thirty
million American workers to revolutionary views would necessarily be a
slow one. Before the predicted cataclysm could supervene, there would
be ample time and opportunity to meet false assertions by evidence and
fallacious reasoning by sound argument. If the only evil apprehended
was illegal violence in the final struggle, there could be no basis for a
claim that mere assemblage with this society, although formed to ad-
vocate the noxious doctrine, would create imminent danger of the evil.
There was absent that proximate relation of cause to consequence of
which alone the law commonly takes account.
The claim seriously urged is a different one. It is that the Communist
Party of America advocates, as a means of preparation for the final strug-
gle, the immediate commission of criminal acts of violence or other
unlawful methods of terrorism; and that the possibility of such immediate
preparatory acts constitutes clear and present danger which justifies de-
nial of the right of assembly. The Program supplies ample evidence that
the Party plans to propagate immediately the criminal state of mind. It
proclaims boldly the foul doctrine that the end justifies the means. It
declares that the party does not feel itself bound by existing laws, because
these were forced upon the workers by the "bourgeois class state." It
states that it will prepare the workers for the ultimate armed insurrection
incident to overthrowing the capitalist state, by teaching [7] its members
and other workers, that during the intermediate period of preparation,
the fighting proletariat must come into open conflict "with bourgeois
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justice and the organs of bourgeois state apparatus." But, while the crim-
inal state of mind was to be developed, the time was apparently not then
deemed ripe for putting foul doctrines into practice, either as a means
of preparation and education or otherwise.
The Party announces its purpose to unite industrial workers, farm
laborers, working farmers and negroes, and to build a United Front of
the whole exploited class, so that its direct mass power may become a
factor in the class struggle, which is eventually to culminate in armed
insurrection and civil war. It declares, that in order to educate members
of the Party to assume leadership of the mass, its tentacles should reach
out into every form of workers' organizations; that it will strive to control
these organizations and the workers; and that its members should par-
ticipate in elections and endeavor to revolutionize both organized and
unorganized labor. But neither in the record, nor in matter of which we
take judicial notice, is there any basis for a contention that in 1922 the
time and conditions were deemed by the Party opportune for any form
of immediate violence, or that there was any reason for belief on the
part of the state authorities that the Party deemed it to be so. So far as
it appears, neither the Party, nor any member of it had therefore resorted
to any act of violence, or had attempted, threatened, or conspired to do
so; or deemed that immediate acts of violence were then advisable.
The Party propagation of the criminal state of mind by its teaching,
and its program of violence as a means of preparation, bring the danger
incident to formation of the society nearer than it would be, if the only
violence to be apprehended were that involved in the predicted final
struggle. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to
increase the probability that there will be some violation of it.2 Con-
donation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval
add to the probability. Advocacy heightens it still further. But even ad-
vocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification
for [81 denying free speech, where, as here, the advocacy falls short of
incitement. Here, there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would
be immediately acted on. To support a finding of such danger it would
have to be shown either that immediate violence was, in fact, advocated,
or that the past conduct of Ruthenberg, or other delegate furnished
reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated. The doc-
uments introduced showed little more than what sort of people were
gathered at the convention, their beliefs and their hopes.
Ruthenberg was not an obscure or mysterious person. He and his
history were well known. He was nearly forty years old. Continuously
2 CompareJudge Learned Hand in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535, 540;
Judge Amidon in United States v. Fortuna, Bull. Dept. Justice No. 148, pp. 4-5; Chafee,
"Freedom of Speech," pp. 46-56, 174.
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since his birth he had been a citizen of Cleveland, Ohio. From 1909 to
1919, he had been an active member of the Socialist Party. He had several
times been its candidate for mayor. He had been its candidate, also, for
state treasurer, for governor, for representative in Congress and for
United States senator. It is true that he had been arrested repeatedly in
Cleveland and elsewhere. But no prosecution had ripened into final sen-
tence, except one. That was for violation of the Selective Draft Act by
inducing another to fail to register. See Ruthenberg v. United States, 245
U.S. 480. All other prosecutions were likewise for political speeches or
for the circulation of political literature. There is not even a suggestion
that Ruthenberg had, in any connection, committed, or attempted or
conspired to commit, or had incited any other person to commit, any
act of violence or terrorism.
The past conduct of the others in attendance at the Bridgman con-
vention afforded likewise no basis for apprehending immediate violence.
Every person present was a duly accredited delegate. All that these men
had done, and all that they planned, had presumably been learned by
the State. For ever since the organization of the party in September,
1919, Francis A. Morrow had been employed by the Department of
Justice as a spy upon its operations. In that capacity, he joined the Party
and had become active in its counsels. Being active and trusted, he had
been elected as a delegate to this convention. It was he who became
their chief witness. But neither through his testimony, nor otherwise,
was there introduced a particle of evidence that these delegates, or any
of the Party's officers, had advocated resort in the near future to crime,
sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means
of preparation for accomplishing industrial or political reform, or for
any other purpose, either in Michi[9]gan or elsewhere in the United
States, or had attempted or conspired or threatened to resort, or had
incited any other person to resort to such means of preparation.
The secrecy of the meeting was not, under the circumstances, evidence
of any such illegal purpose. Secrecy was resorted to, not because the
formation of the Party was believed to be illegal, or because some act
in violation of some law of Michigan or of the United States was con-
templated, but for a very different reason. Those who formed the Com-
munist Party of America at Chicago in 1919 had done so openly. The
organization meeting and its later proceedings had been as public as
those of other political parties. Without change of platform or general
plans, the Party was converted later into a secret organization, because
the Secretary of Labor had ruled meanwhile that mere membership in
it by an alien authorized his deportation under the Act of Congress,
October 16, 1918, c. 186, § 2, 40 Stat. 1012, amended June 5, 1920, c.
251, 41 Stat. 1008; and because several thousand persons resident in the
United States had been arrested through operations of the Department
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of Justice, on the charge that they were aliens liable to deportation
because of membership in the Communist Party of America. See Colyer
v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17? As most of the members of the Party were
aliens, the Secretary's ruling, and the occurrences of January, 1920, led
the Party to believe that secrecy was essential to its existence.4
The jury were not instructed that there must be clear and present
danger of immediate violence to justify conviction. It is contended that
neither the jury nor this Court has any concern with the question whether
the existence of this weak political party did in fact furnish a reasonable
basis for the belief that assembling with it constituted a clear and present
danger of serious evil; that it was the function of the legislature of the
State to determine [10] whether, under then existing conditions, vol-
untary assembly with a society formed to advocate the overthrow of
organized government by force and violence constituted a clear and pre-
sent danger of substantive evil; and that, by enacting the measure, the
legislature had impliedly decided that question in the affirmative. Com-
pare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668-671. The legislature must,
obviously, determine, in the first instance, whether a danger exists which
calls for the particular protective measure which it enacts. But where the
statute enacted is valid only in case certain conditions exist, the enactment
cannot alone establish the facts which are essential conditions of the
statute's validity. This is not a case like Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1,
where the prosecution relies upon the statute as creating a rebuttable
presumption.
Statutes enacted under the police power, which imposed merely ab-
solute prohibition, as distinguished from regulation, have been repeatedly
held invalid in cases involving the liberty to engage in business.5 The
power and duty of this Court are no less where the liberty involved is
that of free speech and assembly.
3 Among the members so arrested were many citizens, but all these were immediately
released as soon as the fact of citizenship was ascertained. This action by the Government
showed that there was no reason to believe that the persons arrested had violated either
any federal or state law, since in making the arrests agents of the Department of Justice
cooperated with the state authorities. "The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen Twenty,"
by Louis E Post, pp. 51-55.
4"The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen Twenty," by Louis E Post, pp. 80-153.
'Compare Frost v. R.R. Comm. of California, 271 U.S. _; Weaver v. Palmer Bros.
Co., 270 U.S. 402; Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504; Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590.
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APPENDIX Bt
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 3 - October Term, 1926
Charlotte Anita Whitney, In Error to the District Court of
Plaintiff in Error Appeal, Appellate District, Division
vs. One of the State of California
The People of the State of
California.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring.
This writ of error was allowed under §237 of the Judicial Code solely
on the ground that a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution was
denied. Our power of review in this case is necessarily limited to the
question, Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590; Haire v. Rice, 204
U. S. 291, 301; and as to it, there can be no review unless, and except
so far as, the claim of right was duly made below, and the denial was
followed by appropriate exceptions. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Duval, 225
U. S. 447, 485-488. For the writ of error is to a state court; and we,
therefore, lack the power occasionally exercised on review of judgments
of lower federal courts to correct in criminal cases vital errors, even
although the objection was not taken in the trial court. Wiborg v. United
States, 163 U. S. 632, 659-660; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207,
221-222.
The claim mainly urged is that the Criminal Syndicalism Act as here
applied violates the right of free speech and assembly. It was not disputed
that the defendant became a member of the Communist Labor Party;
was on its committee of resolutions; and attended its meetings in Cal-
ifornia from time to time. The evidence was directly largely to the issue
whether the organization was of such a character as to bring it within
the class of organizations prohibited by the statute. For reasons stated
t © Harvard University Law School Library. This unpublished draft opinion is located
in The Louis Brandeis Papers: Part 1, 1916-1931 (Harvard Legal Manuscripts, Harvard Law
School Library), microfilm reel 34, frames 00370-00371, and is reproduced with per-
mission of the Harvard Law School Library. It was not contained in Alexander M. Bickel,
The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis (Harvard University Press, 1957) or else-
where. This draft was the printed version of revisions thatJustice Brandeis made on January
3, 1927. It appears to be the last draft of the Whitney concurrence that Justice Brandeis
composed before Charles Ruthenberg's death on March 2, 1927, the dismissal of Ruth-
enberg's writ of error on March 14, and the subsequent incorporation of text from Bran-
deis' Ruthenberg dissent into his expanded Whitney concurrence. In any case, based on the
information available to us, it is impossible for us to know whether or notJustice Brandeis
would have made further modifications to the January 3
r
d draft opinion in Whitney if the
events concerning the Ruthenberg case had not occurred. The bold and bracketed number
in the text refers to the original printed page number in the concurrence.
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by me in Ruthenberg v. Michigan, decided this day, the statute is, in my
opinion, invalid, if applied at a time when there did not exist clear [2]
and present danger as there defined. Whether in 1919, when Miss Whit-
ney did the things complained of, there was such danger in California,
might have been made the important issue in the case. The defendant
might have required that either the court or the jury determine that
issue. But she made no specific request to that end. She did not even
make a general request for a directed verdict. On the other hand, there
was evidence on which the court or jury might have found that such
danger existed. Under these circumstances the judgment of the state
court cannot be disturbed.

